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Article II Courts
by David J. Bederman*

It is understandable that a reader may be puzzled by the title of this
study. American lawyers are undoubtedly familiar with the notion of
"constitutional" courts established under Article III of the Constitution.1
They also are likely to recall another class of federal tribunals, created by
virtue of the legislative authority vested in Congress by Article I of the
Constitution.' However, few lawyers and scholars are aware that there exists a third class of courts created by the Constitution. These are executive courts that, from time to time in the Republic's history, have been
formed to administer justice, in times of war or civil unrest, over territories occupied by American armed forces.
There is no question that these tribunals have been considered anomalous, as aberrations of established constitutional order. Indeed, little intellectual effort has been expended in examining the constitutional place
of presidential courts. In the midst of war or its aftermath, few were
brave enough to criticize the President's establishment of courts of law.
Fewer still were prepared to argue that his power should be limited by
other provisions of the Constitution. Instead, a pattern of judicial deference begun with the establishment of the first such court in the Mexican
War of 1846 has persisted to this day. Exceptions to this trend have been
noted, and it may even be apparent that a new constitutional practice of
Article II courts has evolved. Nonetheless, the President's power in this
field has gone virtually unchallenged.
This Article carefully examines the creation, operation, and jurisprudence of executive courts. As a first step, however, it is essential to accurately define what is meant when one refers to an Article II court. This
* Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. Princeton University
(A.B., 1983); London School of Economics (M.Sc., 1984); University of Virginia (J.D., 1987);
Hague Academy of International Law (Dip., 1989). I am grateful for the comments generated by the Emory University School of Law Faculty Colloquium, and especially for the
advice of Professor Charles A. Shanor. All errors and omissions are mine, of course.
1. U.S. CONsT. art. III.
2. Id. art. I.
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inquiry places in sharp focus the traditional constitutional dichotomy between Article III "constitutional" courts and Article I legislative tribunals. Adding presidential courts to this matrix does not upset the analysis
used heretofore; it merely places a greater premium on identifying the
constitutional source of power for creating the court in question.
Once this Article clarifies what is and what is not an executive court, it
will introduce the historical examples of this institution. I have identified
twelve tribunals that satisfy the definition propounded here. Although
most date from the Civil War and before, four of them operated in this
century, and one of them rendered a judgment no more than twelve years
ago. Undoubtedly others exist that my research has not revealed. Each of
these courts shared one thing in common: they were established by federal authorities occupying territory as a result of armed conflict. The constitutional problems raised by belligerent occupation, including the maintenance of law and order and the establishment of justice, will be
considered since this provided the practical imperative for the exercise of
the President's power to constitute judicial tribunals. How the President
exercised and delegated this power is also significant. More important,
however, is to understand how the power was limited, whether by the
President's own restraint, judicial review, or the passage of time and the
termination of hostilities.
What remains is the question of what law was applied by Article II
courts. Addressing this inquiry brings one face-to-face with one of the
most complex and vexing issues in current constitutional discourse: the
applicability of the Constitution to persons outside of the United States.
Because executive courts were invariably created beyond the nation's borders, or at least beyond that area in which the United States exercised
effective control, parties raised the issue when seeking a protection
granted by the federal Constitution. In addition, Article II judges also
had to decide whether they were obliged to apply local law to their proceedings, no matter how alien, primitive, or doctrinally unacceptable that
law may be.
Executive courts were the product of military occupation. As a consequence, their decisions often implicated very delicate issues of national
security and separation of powers. The story of Article II courts is thus a
narrative of judicial improvisation transformed over time into regular and
predictable constitutional order. In contemplation of the likelihood that
no new executive courts will be created, it seems a propitious moment to
look back, take stock, and learn the lessons taught by this curious species
of government institution.

ARTICLE 11 COURTS
I. WHAT IS AN ARTICLE II COURT?
In the beginning, there was the clear and clarion command of the Constitution. It provided simply that:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not
be diminished during their Continuance in Office.5

There is no doubt that the intent of the Framers was to establish a judiciary independent and impartial, by ensuring life tenure and protection
against diminution of salary." Just as important, the intent of the clause

was to vest the entire judicial power of the United States, as was defined
in the following provision,' in judicial tribunals possessing just that inde-

pendence and integrity. And, at first, all courts established by Congress
could easily be qualified as "constitutional," or Article III, tribunals.
The trouble began with the 1828 Supreme Court decision in American
Insurance Co. v. Canter.' In American Insurance, the Court had to decide the legal status of a territorial court established by Congress. In reply to an argument made that such a court lacked authority under the
Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, said that

those territorial tribunals
[were) not constitutional Courts, in which the judicial power conferred
by the Constitution on the general government, can be deposited. They
are incapable of receiving it. They are legislative Courts, created in virtue
3. Id. art. III, § 1.
4. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 494-96; No. 79, at 497 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke
ed. 1961). See also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776) (listing among
the grievances against King George III the fact that "He has made Judges dependent on his
Will alone, for the Tenure of their offices, and the Amount and Payment of their Salaries.").
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I (setting forth heads of jurisdiction).
6. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). This dispute came from the territory of Florida. An earlier
act of Congress, March 30, 1822, ch. 13, §§ 6, 8, 3 Stat. 656 (1822), had created two Superior
Courts for that territory, with judges to serve four-year terms, and had authorized the territorial legislature to create other, inferior tribunals. One of these was established later at Key
West and given jurisdiction over salvage matters, and the members were paid a fee based on
the value of the salvage. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 512-14. See also Act of May 23, 1828, ch. 77, 4
Stat. 292 (1828).
A ship was wrecked on the coast of Florida, part of the cargo was saved, and a judicial
sale of the cargo was ordered by the court at Key West at which David Canter bought a
consigment of cotton. Later, American Insurance Company, which was subrogated to the
rights of the cargo owners, brought suit in Charleston for Canter's cotton, claiming that the
sale was invalid because the court at Key West had exceeded its jurisdiction. Id. at 512-20.
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of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in
virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules
and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States.
The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the Constitution, but is
conferred by Congress, in the execution of those general powers
which
7
that body possesses over the territories of the United States.

And even though the territorial tribunal in question exercised a judicial
power reserved for Article III courts, that of admiralty jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court nonetheless held that "the same limitation does not extend to the territories. In legislating for them, Congress exercises the
combined powers of the general [that is, federal], and . . . state
government."

Accordingly, territorial courts were distinguished from tribunals established under Article III of the Constitution. Territorial judges were subject to removal and -salary reductions.' Chief Justice Marshall's distinction between "constitutional" and legislative courts has endured,
although extraordinary doctrinal confusion has arisen when the status of
other courts has been considered. Chief among these other judicial organs
were the Court of Claims, 10 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,"

7. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 546 (Marshall, C.J.).
8. Id. For more on this case see, Gary Lawson, TerritorialGovernments and the Limits
of Formalism, 78 CALiw. L. R-v.853, 887-93 (1990).
9. See McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S.' 174 (1891); United States v.Fisher, 109
U.S. 143 (1883).
10. See Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864) (in which Supreme Court
refused to hear appeals from the Court of Claims because the authority of the Secretary of
the Treasury -to revise its decisions denied the Supreme Court judicial power); Williams v.
United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933) (holding the Court of Claims to be a legislative court);
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (after a clarifying statute was passed, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Claims was a constitutional court for the purpose of
assignment of judges).
Under the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-146, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 171-77, 1295-96, 1491, 1631, 2503, 2510, 2522 (1988)), Congress bifurcated the jurisdiction of the Courtof Claims. The trial duties were vested in a Claims Court,
an Article I court, and the appellate function was given over to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, an Article III tribunal.
11. See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929) (holding that the Court of Customs
Appeals was a legislative court and could thus properly render the equivalent of an advisory
opinion, an activity from which Article III courts are excluded); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530 (1962) (after Congress adopted a clarifying statute, the Court held that the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals was an Article III court).
Under the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-146, 96 Stat. 25 (codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 171-77, 1295-96, 1491, 1631, 2503, 2510, 2522 (1988)), the jurisdiction of
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was given over to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, established as an Article III court. Id.
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and the courts of the District of Columbia. 12 These cases raised the question of when the judicial functions of the United States could be entrusted to judicial officers who were not guaranteed life tenure and salary
protection.
In some instances the distinction was made based on the supposed
powers of the court. If the tribunal exercised Article III jurisdiction, then
its judges must have Article III tenure. If the tribunal did not exercise
Article III jurisdiction then Article III protections were unnecessary. In
other circumstances, judges deemed Congress' intent dispositive. If Congress determined that Article III established a court, then, presumably,
those judges received life tenure. Yet Congress sometimes explicitly
granted tenure and salary protection to judges sitting on what Congress
13
acknowledged to be Article I courts.
In short, the distinction between constitutional and legislative courts
has always been a bit of a fiction." Indeed, Article I and Article III courts
share one obvious and very significant thing in common: they are all, with
the single exception of the Supreme Court, established by Congress.
Taken literally, of course, the term "constitutional court" could only refer
to the Supreme Court since it is the only judicial organ mandated by the
Constitution itself. Nonetheless, the distinction persists. In Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 1 5 the Court examined the constitutionality of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act's" crea12. See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 450-55 (1929) (Van Devanter, J.) (contending in dicta that the courts of the District of Columbia were legislative courts);
O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 546-50 (1933) (reversing the suggestion made in
Bakelite and holding that courts in the District of Columbia possessed a hybrid character
and qualified as constitutional courts).
Under the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act, Pub. L. No.
91-358, 84 Stat. 473-668 (1970), the United States District Court for the District of Columbia and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit lost jurisdiction over matters of local concern and those matters were vested in a local court system, with the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals as the highest court of the jurisdiction. Id. See also Palmore
v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) (declaring that local courts of the District were Article
I tribunals and no longer had a hybrid status).
13. See, e.g., Act of September 12, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-571, 80 Stat. 764 (1966) (granting life tenure to judges on the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico);
see also United States v. Montanez, 371 F.2d 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 884 (1967).
14. See generally Wilbur Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARv. L. Rav. 894 (1930);
George Watson, Concept of the Legislative Court: A ConstitutionalFiction, 10 Gao. WASH.
L. REV. 799 (1942); Note, The Distinction between Legislative and Constitutional Courts
and its Effect on JudicialAssignment, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 133 (1962); Comment, Legislative
and ConstitutionalCourts: What Lurks ahead for Bifurcation, 71 YALE LJ. 979 (1962).
15. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
16. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
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tion of bankruptcy courts in each judicial district," and a majority of the
justices agreed that the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts could not extend to matters properly within the cognizance of the federal district
courts."
Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, attempted to bring order to
the chaos of precedent on legislative courts. Noting the language in the
Supreme Court's 1856 decision in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., ' which recognized that Congress may assign some judicial authority to non-Article III courts, 0 the Northern Pipeline plurality wrote that:
[W]hen properly understood, these precedents represent no broad departure from the constitutional command that the judicial power of the
United States must be vested in Art. III courts. Rather, they reduce to
three narrow situations not subject to that command, each recognizing a
circumstance in which the grant of power to the Legislative and Executive Branches was historically and constitutionally so exceptional that
the congressional assertion of a power to create legislative courts was
consistent with, rather than threatening to, the constitutional mandate of
separation of powers.21
The three classes of legislative courts recognized by the plurality were
territorial courts, courts-martial, and those tribunals and agencies "created by Congress to adjudicate cases involving 'public rights.' "" One
17. See Bankruptcy Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). Bankruptcy
court judges were appointed to fourteen-year terms, subject to removal by the judicial councilin which they serve on grounds of incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty, or disability. Their salaries were set by statute and could be reduced. 458 U.S. at 53.
Northern Pipeline filed a petition for reorganization in the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Minnesota. Subsequently, Northern Pipeline filed a suit in the
same court against Marathon for alleged breach of contract and other common law claims.
Id. at 56. Marathon moved for dismissal "on the ground that the Act unconstitutionally
conferred Art. III judicial power on judges who lacked life tenure and salary protection." Id.
at 56-57. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion, but on appeal the District Court
granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 57-89.
18. 458 U.S. at 89-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). For an intense criticism of the methodology employed by the Court in this case, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARv. L. REv. 916 (1988).
19. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
20. 458 U.S. at 63 (construing 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284) (certain matters "congress may
or may not bring within the cognizance of [Art. III courts], as it may deem proper.").
21. Id. at 63-64 (Brennan, J.) (footnote omitted).
22. Id. at 64-67 (Brennan, J.). For more on the notion of courts adjudicating public
rights, see Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442,
450 (1977); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932); Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land &
Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855).

ARTICLE II COURTS
must suppose from the plurality's judgment that all other courts would
consist of Article III judges.28
As suggested above, however, no ground exists for distinguishing between constitutional and legislative courts. A distinction based on
whether the tribunal exercises any jurisdiction under Article III of the
Constitution seems to be the most satisfactory approach. Nevertheless,
problems arise when the same court possesses authority over both Article
III subject-matters and over state law issues and questions reserved
under federal legislation. Nor can congressional intent always be dispositive in making a determination as to the source of power for a federal
court. After all, Congress could later revoke an enactment providing
judges with life tenure and, salary guarantees with a finding that Article
III of the Constitution did not establish the court in question.
What, then, is distinctive about a court established under Article II of
the Constitution? First, executive tribunals are established without an act
of Congress or any other form of legislative concurrence. Congressional
intent concerning the status of a presidential court is irrelevant because
no congressional approval is needed. The fact that the President alone
can create an executive court places it outside the scope of Article III of
the Constitution, which demands that Congress shall establish courts inferior to the Supreme Court. Second, executive courts are created pursuant only to the power and authority granted to the President in Article II
of the Constitution. In practice, the only presidential power that would
call for the creation of a court is that arising from his responsibility as
Commander in Chief of the armed services and his consequent war-mak4
ing authority.2
23. But see 458 U.S. at 103-116 (White, J., dissenting) (providing a careful refutation of

the plurality's analysis of the distinction between Article I and Article III courts). See also
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1986) (in a case con-

cerning federal agency adjudication of a state law counterclaim, the Court established a
four-part test for determining the validity of a given exercise of judicial power by a nonArticle III tribunal: first, "the extent to which the 'essential attributes of judicial power' are
reserved to Article III courts" through appellate review; second, "the extent to which the
non-Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in
Article HI courts"; third, "the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated"; and
fourth, "the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article III.")

(citations omitted).
24. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 ("The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States ....."). An argument might be made that the President's power to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," might implicate the crea-

tion of courts, but this is most unlikely. Id. § 3. In the same vein, the general grant of
executive power in Article II, section 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President
. . ."), is no longer considered an independent ground
supporting the creation of executive tribunals. See generally, Lous HENKIN, FOREIGN AyFAIRS AND THE CoNsTrruTroN 42-44, 54-56 (1975). But cf. Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370 (1863)

of the United States of America .
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Under the working definition employed in this study, an Article II
court is a tribunal established: (1) pursuant only to the President's warmaking power under Article II of the Constitution; (2) which exercises
either civil jurisdiction or criminal jurisdiction over civilians in peacetime;
and (3) was constituted without an Act of Congress or any other legislative concurrence. This typology excludes a number of different sorts of
federal courts that have been established in the past. It is important and
useful to indicate the character of these other tribunals and to distinguish
them from presidential courts.
To begin with, it is manifest that territorial courts are Article I, and
not Article II, tribunals. They are established by Congress in view of its
power to "make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States."15 Congress created the territorial courts and they have no life independent and apart
from it.
Consular courts present a more difficult question. Congress established
these tribunals in those countries in which treaties granted the United
States extraterritorial privileges. These agreements did not, however, directly establish consular courts. This required an act of Congress," which
was an exercise of its power to regulate foreign commerce.27 Congress endowed the consuls with judicial authority,' a practice later approved by
the Supreme Court,2 9 and typically limited consular jurisdiction to criminal prosecutions and a small class of civil actions in which both parties
were usually Americans. 0 With the exception of the United States Court
(Perkins, J.) ("The right ...

of the President to temporarily govern localities ...

derives

solely from the fact that he is the commander-in-chief of the army, and is to see that the
laws are executed ....
Id. at 382-83.
25. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
26. See Act of Aug. 11, 1848, ch. 150, 9 Stat. 276; Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 179, 12 Stat.
72; Act of July 28, 1866, § 11, 14 Stat. 322; Act of July 1, 1870, ch. 194, § 1, 16 Stat. 183. The
statutes applied to China, Japan, Siam, Turkey, Persia, Tripoli, Tunis, Morocco, Muscat,
the Samoan Islands, and to any other country with which an appropriate treaty was made.
Act of June 14, 1878, ch. 193, 20 Stat. 131. See also 2 JOHN BASSETT MooRE, A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 613 (1906); RAVNDAL, THE ORIGIN OF THE CAPITULATIONS AND THE CONSULAR INSTITUTION, S. Doc. No. 34, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921).
27. See Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929).
28. See 2 MOORE, supra note 26, at 613-17 (for a full discussion of the limits of a consul's
jurisdiction).
29. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 468-71 (1891) (upholding conviction by consul of a
seaman for murder on board an American vessel at Yokohama, Japan); Dainese v. Hale, 91
U.S. 13 (1875) (interpreting treaties with Turkey so that consuls exercise judicial authority
over Americans there).

30. See E.

SURRENcY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS

325 (1987).
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for China, which operated from 1906 to 1943,1 an appeal of a consular

court decision to an Article III court was not possible,88 and the "judges"
of these tribunals had no tenure.88 Congress never established the applicable law in these courts,

4

although the Supreme Court did rule in 1890

that the Constitution did not extend overseas to their proceedings.38 The
United States abandoned, its last extraterritorial privileges in 1956, thus
closing the door on consular jurisdiction se But because Congress' foreign
commerce power expressly established courts of consular jurisdiction,
they plainly do not qualify as Article II courts.
Likewise, Article I of the Constitution sanctioned courts-martial.37
These tribunals, established to govern discipline in the American armed
forces, predate the Constitution itself," and comprise a distinct and sepa31. See Act of June 30, 1906, ch. 3934, 34 Stat. 814. For more on this most peculiar
court, see David J. Bederman, ExtraterritorialDomicile and the Constitution, 28 VA. J.
INT'L L. 451, 460-63 (1988); Charles S. Lobingier, A QuarterCentury of Our Extraterritorial
Court, 20 GEO. L.J. 427 (1932); Charles Loring, American Extraterritorialityin China, 10
MINN. L. REv. 407 (1926). The Court for China was vested with exclusive jurisdiction for all
civil cases against American citizens residing in China in which the amount exceeded $500,
and for crimes committed by American citizens residing there when the punishment could
exceed a $100 fine or sixty days imprisonment. Act of June 30, 1906, §§ 2 & 4.
32. A consul's decision could be reviewed by his minister or commissioner. See Act of
Aug. 11, 1848, ch. 150, § 9, 9 Stat. 276, 277. An exception was made for appeals from the
decision of consuls in Japan and China. Act of July 1, 1870, ch. 194, §§ 3-8, 16 Stat. 183, 184
(amending Act of June 22, 1860, ch. 179, 12 Stat. 72). See also THE PING-ON v. Blethen,
11 F. 607 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (Hoffman, J.); THE SPARK v. Lee Choi Chum, 22 F. Cas. 871
(C.C.D. Cal. 1872) (No. 13,206) (Sawyer, J.).
33. The judges of the U.S. Court for China served terms of ten years. Act of June 30,
1906, ch. 3934, § 7, 34 Stat. 814, 816. Another criticism of the consular court system was
that, typically, consuls had no training in the law. See Lobingier, supra note 31, at 431-33
n.27 (quoting one tribute to a former Consul General in China: "'He didn't know anything
about law, but he was hell on equity.' ")
34. See Bederman, supra note 31, at 470-74.
35. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891). See also Maryellen Fullerton, Hijacking Trials
Overseas: The Need for an Article III Court, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 58-60 (1986) (placing this case in the context of later constitutional developments).
36. Joint Resolution of Aug. 1, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-856, 70 Stat. 773 (relinquishing
consular privileges in Morocco).
37, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To makes Rules
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.").
38. The Articles of War, enacted by the Continental Congress in 1775 to govern the
American Revolutionary Army, expressly provided for trial by court-martial of soldiers and
civilians serving with the army. See American Articles of War, art. XXXII, reprinted in
Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 349 n.15 (1952) ("All settlers and retailers to a camp, and
all persons whatsoever, serving with the continental army in the field, though not inlisted
soldiers, are to be subject to the articles, rules, and regulations of the continental army.").
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rate system of justice.8 s Since 1858 the Supreme Court has consistently
ruled that courts-martial are not subject to Article III strictures.40 While
Congress has steadily increased the criminal subject-matter jurisdiction of
these tribunals to encompass all felonies in wartime or peacetime, 41 the
Court has ruled that soldiers and sailors active in the service must be
charged only with service-connected crimes, 4 2 that soldiers and sailors
dismissed from the service are immune from military process, 4' and, most
importantly, that the trial of civilians is forbidden." In the long history of
courts-martial, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court have considered
them as anything other than Article I tribunals.
Military commissions, as distinct from courts-martial, present some
features that closely parallel the definition of Article II courts noted
above. While courts-martial ensure discipline within the ranks, the nation's armed forces have designed military commissions, composed exclusively of officers, to impose authority upon enemy combatants and civilians actively engaged in hindering the war effort." Although federal
statute recognizes military commissions, it is clear that Congress considers them established not by6 virtue of the grant of power under Article I,
but under the laws of war.
39. See, e.g., O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) ("A court-martial is not yet
an independent instrument of justice but remains to a significant degree a specialized part
of the overall mechanism by which military discipline is preserved.") (footnote omitted).
40. See Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857). In this case, a navy seaman, convicted of attempting to desert, challenged the constitutionality of his court-martial. Id. at
65. The Court noted that Congress' plenary authority to establish a system of courts-martial
was "entirely independent" of Article III judicial powers. Id. at 79.
41. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 918, 920 (1988).
42. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
43. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355
(1971). The service-connection test has, however, eroded over the past few years. See Note,
Military Justice and Article III, 103 HARv, L. Rv. 1909, 1915-18 (1990).
44. See McElroy v. United States ex rel Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v.
Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1 (1957).
45. See generally Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 347-53 (1952); Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1, 21-28, 45-48; (1942); W. BIRKHIMER, MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND MARTIAL LAW 351-60

(2d rev. ed. 1904); Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice, 43 STAN. L. REv. 13, 61-71 (1990); Major Willard B. Cowles, The Trial of War
Criminals by Military Tribunals, 30 A.B.A. J. 330 (1944); A. Wigfall Green, The Military
Commission, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 832 (1948).
46. See 10 U.S.C. § 821 (1988) (article 21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice) ("The
provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive military
commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military
commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals.").
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The first military commission constituted in American history convicted Major Andr6 as a spy in the American Revolution.47 Andrew Jackson ordered the formation of a tribunal to punish two British provocateurs in his suppression of West Florida in 1818."1 Until this time,
Congress often denominated these tribunals as "special courts" or
"boards." General Winfield Scott, during the Mexican War, first called
them by their currently known name . These military commissions figured prominently in the Civil War; in fact, a military commission tried
those accused of assassinating President Lincoln.5 Local Union commanders, garrisoning areas well-behind the front lines, used military commissions extensively to punish any dissent and disorder.51 After some jurisdictional missteps,' the Supreme Court ruled that a military
commission could not be used to try a noncombatant civilian in areas
where the civil courts were still in operation."
Most military commissions were established to enforce military discipline among civilian populations and to punish spies, saboteurs, provocateurs, and those that seriously disturbed the public order."4 To the extent
47. See BIRKHIMER, supra note 45, at 351 (mentioning also the trial, by military commission, of Joshua Kett Smith).
48. Id. at 351-54.
49. See id. at 351, 354-55; Cowles, supra note 45, at 331. For the text of General Scott's
General Order No. 20, as amended by General Order No. 287, Sept. 17, 1847, authorizing the
appointment of military commissions in Mexico, see BIRKHIMER, supra note 45, at 581-82.
See also Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties 4044, 167-75 (1991) (for more on the history of military commissions through the Civil War).
50. See Ex Parte Mudd, 17 F. Cas. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1868) (No. 9,899) (a summary of the
otherwise lost decision in Dr. Mudd's habeas appeal of a conviction by a military tribunal
for giving aid and comfort to John Wilkes Booth; court held that the commission was properly constituted); 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 297 (1865) (authorization for the military commission to
try Lincoln's assassins); Cowles, supra note 45, at 330.
51. See Act of July 2, 1864, ch. 215, § 1, 13 Stat. 356 (giving equal recognition to
"sentences of military commissions as [well as] to those of courts-martial" and extending
jurisdiction of both to "spies, mutineers, deserters, and murderers"); see also Madsen v.
Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346 (1952); Cowles, supra note 45, at 330 (providing more details on
this period).
52. See Ex parte Vallandingham, 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 243 (1863). Petitioner had been convicted by a military tribunal of uttering seditious statements at a public meeting in Ohio.
Id. at 244-47. The Court held that it had no jurisdiction to entertain a writ of certiorari to
directly review the proceeding. Id. at 249-54.
53. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127-32 (1866); In re Murphy, 17 F. Cas.
1030 (C.C.D. Mo. 1867) (No. 9,947); United States v. Commandant of Fort Delaware, 25 F.
Cas. 590, 591 (D. Del. 1866) (No. 14,842).
54. For a recent case, see Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), in which a military commission tried eight German soldiers who had been landed by submarine in the United States
to carry out various acts of sabotage. The President appointed a military commission of five
officers, and the Attorney General prosecuted the case. Defendants were not afforded a jury
trial, nor were they indicted by a grand jury. Id. at 18-24. The Supreme Court turned away
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that a military commission prosecuted an alien belligerent or combatant,
Congress clearly excluded them from the definition of an Article II court
proposed here. These were offenses against the laws of war, and, as such,
were not carried out, strictly speaking, pursuant to the war powers of the
President. Even more importantly, the military did not actually direct
these proceedings against civilians. 55
Finally, one needs to refer to some sui generis institutions that, although appearing to have the characteristics of an Article II court, in fact,
do not. Among these are the international war crimes trials conducted by
the victorious Allied powers after the Second World War. After conviction in their respective Nurenburg and Tokyo courts, and placement
under United States custody, German and Japanese defendants later
sought habeas corpus relief. Courts consistently ruled that these international military tribunals were not part of the courts of the United States
and, as a result, no American court had the power to review their decisions.se These international war crimes trials were convened by international agreement,5 7 and so were not an exercise of-either the President's
Article II powers or any power under the Constitution.
In one recorded instance, a treaty actually established an American
court. In 1862, the United States and Great Britain agreed on further
all challenges of the constitutionality of the military commission. In wartime, the Court
ruled, the President could constitutionally assign espionage and sabotage cases (at least
those involving foreign nationals) to a military court. Id. at 46.
See also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), in which following the Japanese surrender in
the Phillippines, the commanding Japanese officer was tried before a military commission
for war crimes. Id. at 5. The Supreme Court, after reviewing the long history of military
commissions and citing to the Congress' explicit grant for their use, 10 U.S.C. § 821 (article
21 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), held that the commission was properly constituted, even though hostilities had ended. 327 U.S. at 9-13.
55. Some tribunals, specifically denominated as "military commissions," did exercise either civil jurisdiction or criminal jurisdiction over civilians in peacetime. For the purposes of
the study, these courts will be considered as Article II tribunals. The Supreme Court recognized this phenomenon when it referred in Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) to
"United States occupation courts in the nature of [military] commissions." Id. at 346.
56. See Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 198 (1948); Flick v. Johnson, 174 F.2d 983
(D.C. Cir. 1949); Brandt v. United States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948); Milch v. United States, 332
U.S. 789 (1947); Everett v. Truman, 334 U.S. 824 (1948) (per curiam); see also Robert B.
Ely, III, The Treaty Making Power: The Constitutionality of InternationalCourts, 36
A.B.A. J. 738 (1950).
57. See Moscow Declaration, Oct. 30, 1943, reprintedin 9 DEP'T STATE BULL. 307 (1943);
London Agreement & Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, reprinted in 13 DFn'T STATE BULL. 222 (1947); see also Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197,
205-07 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing the constitution of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East).
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measures to suppress the slave trade.5 Included was provision for rights
of visit on the high seas of vessels suspected of engaging in the trade." If
a British naval vessel found an American slaver, or vice versa, the treaty,
and subsequent enabling legislation," required civil forfeiture proceedings before mixed. claims courts established at New York, Sierra Leone,
and the Cape of Good Hope.6 1 The decisions of these courts could not be
appealed."s Although this tribunal exercised civil jurisdiction, unlike most
military tribunals (either international or domestic), the fact that legislative concurrence created this one invalidates its claim as an Article II
a judge
court. Nevertheless, while it seems the United States did appoint
6
to sit on this court, no other evidence of its proceedings exists. 3
Thus, one can characterize Article II courts in both an affirmative and
negative manner. A definition that focuses on the source of the constitutional authority of these tribunals (the President's war-making powers),
as well as their functions (civil jurisdiction and/or criminal jurisdiction
over civilians in peacetime), seems to provide a cogent and careful way to
discriminate between these institutions and similar ones. Although doubt
exists about classifying some of these other tribunals-particularly, certain military commissions-what remains is a special category of American court. The next section offers a profile of all of these Article II courts.
II. A

SURVEY OF EXECUTIVE COURTS

This author has identified the establishment of twelve Article II courts
in the history of the United States for which some record-no matter how
sparse-has remained. Aside from comporting with the definition provided above, they all share one thing in common: they were each constituted by the armed forces of the United States occupying territory cap58. Treaty for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade (Treaty of Washington), Apr.
7, 1862, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 12 Stat. 1225; see also Additional Article, Feb. 17, 1863, 13 Stat. 645,
T.S. No. 127.
59. Treaty for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade, supra note 58, art. 1.
60. Act of July 11, 1862, ch. 140, 12 Stat. 531.
61. Treaty for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade, supra note 58, art. 4.
62. Id. art. 4, para. 3.
63. See SURRENCY, supra note 30, at 327-28. See also 2 MOORE, supra note 26, at 946-48.
The treaty was later superceded with an agreement that provided for actions before the
courts of the contracting parties, instead of the mixed claims tribunals. Additional Convention, June 3, 1870, 16 Stat. 777, T.S. No. 131.
Other mixed claims tribunals have been established pursuant to international agreement,

including the recent Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal at The Hague, created by the Claims Settlement Declaration, Jan. 19, 1981, Iran-U.S.-Algeria, reprinted in DEP'T STATE BULL., Feb.
1981, at 1, 3 and 1 Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Reports 3 (1983). These international tribu-

nals cannot be considered courts of the United States. See supra notes 56 & 57 and accompanying text.

838

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

tured from an enemy. For that reason, they have sometimes been referred
to as "occupation courts,"1"1 a term that will be used synonymously with

"Article II," "presidential," or "executive" tribunals. We know about
these courts today because many of them left behind a startling trail of
litigation. As Clinton Rossiter observed:
Those were the days when American traders, and other nationals as well,
could get loose in Vera Cruz or New Orleans or San Juan about one day
after (if not before) the fighting had ceased, and could get involved in the
most complicated squabbles with the military authorities.
'An unlimited number of pages might easily be devoted to the dozens of
cases on this subject, especially since many of them provided the judicial
climax to some rather colorful clashes between civilians at their most
clever and soldiers at their most stupid."
While I have no intention of spending an unlimited number of pages on
the subject, it might be useful to briefly summarize the history of each of
these courts.
A.

The Mexican War

We begin in 1846 with the Mexican War. General Kearney had occupied and established a provisional government in what would later become the territory of New Mexico. ,As part of this provisional government, General Kearney ordered the creation of a two-tiered court system,
including a single appellate court, consisting of three judges, and a number of circuit courts."' The circuit courts were cognizant over all criminal
cases and all civil matters that were not actionable before the prefects or
alcades of the Mexican regime. 7 This court system was largely continued
when New Mexico was organized by Congress as a territory four years
later in 1850.68 Afterwards, the territorial legislature implicitly adopted
the acts, orders, and laws of the earlier provisional government, including
64. See, e.g., Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346, 357 (1952); Fullerton, supra note 35,
at 24.
65.

CLINTON RossrrTR, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 121 (1951).

66. See Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176, 177-78 (1857), aff'g I N.M. (Gild.)

34, 43 (1853).
67. See Leitensdorfer,61 U.S. (20 How.) at 178.
68. See Act of Sept. 9, 1850, ch. 49, § 10, 9 Stat. 446, 449-50. Congress stipulated, however, that the lower territorial court in New Mexico was to be called the "district court," as
opposed to the "circuit courts" of the provisional government. See Leitensdorfer v. Webb,
61 U.S. (20 How.) 176, 180-81 (1857). See also A. POLDERVMRT, BLACK-RoBED JUSTICE: A
HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NEW MEXICO FROM THE AMERICAN OCCUPATION IN 1846 UNTIL STATEHOOD IN 1912 at, 21-31 (1948).
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the decisions of its courts," but not without raising substantial disputes
of right. Nonetheless, for nearly four years, New Mexican tribunals dispensed justice without any constitutional basis, save for the war-making
powers of the President. This was the first Article II court.
The second court was established just a few months later, in 1847. By
then, the victorious American forces had swept the Mexicans out of California, and vigorous naval operations were proceeding in the Pacific. At
Monterey, the naval commander on station, Commodore Biddle, had an
elegant solution to a vexing problem. His captains were capturing lucrative prize vessels. Under the laws of war, these ships had to be brought
into an American port for condemnation proceedings in prize. Regrettably, he could not spare the crews necessary to sail the captured ships
around Cape Horn to a port on the Atlantic seaboard. So, Commodore
Biddle decided to establish his own prize court at Monterey. The military
governor of the territory agreed, and the President later authorized the
order, although with the proviso that the prize money could not be distributed until the Secretary of the Navy concurred with the individual
decisions.7 0 A navy chaplain, whose name has been lost to history, was
named as prize judge.7 1 We have a record of only a single case decided by
the prize court; however, that one case is known quite well since in its
tortuous career it twice made its way before the Supreme Court. 7
B.

The Civil War

The Civil War was the heyday of occupation courts. As Union forces
made incursions against the Confederacy, larger tracts of territory came
under Union control. These areas were placed under military government
and, almost immediately, a need arose for the provision of justice. Many
of these tribunals were so informal as to leave virtually no record at all.
As one contemporary writer noted:
[I]nstitutions in the nature of courts were established by the General
commanding, and an officer was detailed to hear and decide controversies
of a particular character. Soldiers were detailed to execute his commands, to bring the accused before him for trial, and to see that the
judgments pronounced were executed.
69. See New Mexico Act of July 14, 1851, No. 176, quoted in Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 1
N.M. (Gild.) 34, 42 (1853).
70. See Jecker v. Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498, 512-13 (1851).
71. Id. at 512.
72. The reported decisions of this litigation include Jecker v. Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 498 (1851); Fay v. Montgomery, 8 F. Cas. 1112 (C.C.D. Mass. 1852) (No. 4,709);
Jecker v. Montgomery, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 110 (1855).
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Such a court had in fact no legal name, but was known by the name of
the officer who held it. It had no full formal records, although some one
of the men detailed kept a list of the persons in favor of and against
whom judgments were rendered and some brief memorandum of the
judgments themselves, the amount of recovery if any, or the amount of
the fine, or the extent of the imprisonment imposed, and this person
shortly came to be called the clerk, if indeed he was not originally so
christened."5
These tribunals often were known as provost courts. Their jurisdiction
74
was often assimilated to that of justice of the peace or police courts.
These provost courts were extraordinarily ad hoc institutions, often moving with the front lines of the armies. All occupation courts were, of
course, to some degree impermanent, but the provost courts were especially so. Records are sparse for these tribunals, but their use was known
7
to be widespread. 5
Some of these informal courts were charged with civil jurisdiction. Typical of these tribunals was a provisional court established toward the end
of the war by General Saxton in the vicinity of Port Royal, South Carolina.76 A civil commission court was also established in Memphis, Tennessee in 1863 and operated through 1865, 7 although, like General Saxton's
tribunal, the War Department seated in Washington never officially recognized it.7s Some of these civil courts were very specialized in their jurisdiction. The Mississippi Special Court of Equity for Cotton, established
by the military governor of that state in June 1865, was limited in its
competence to "'contracts for cotton or other personal property in this
73. Anonymous, ProvisionalJudiciaryof Louisiana, 4 AM. L. REG. (n.s.) 257, 259 (March
1865).
74. See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 803 (2d ed. 1920). See also
C. MCCLURE, A DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMY

1577,

at 428 (rev. ed. 1901).
75. WINTHROP, supra note 74, at 803-04 (detailing the establishment of provost courts
for the "Department of the Gulf," Virginia, Texas, Arkansas, South Carolina, and the posts
at Vicksburg and Natchez).
76. See 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 149 (1865); 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 86 (1864).
77. See BIRKHIMER, supra note 45, at 143-45. See also Hefferman v. Porter, 46 Tenn. (6
Cold.) 391, 392-93 (1869) (for more on the civil commission court at Memphis); JAMES G.
RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 231 (1964).
78. See Hefferman v. Porter, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 391 (quoting 1863 decision of Judge
Advocate General, ruling that the civil commission was "'an anomalous and irregular tribunal, entirely unauthorized by military law.' "); State v. Stillman, 47 Tenn. (7 Cold.) 341, 352
(1870) (noting that a civil commission was not approved by the President). See also RANDALL, supra note 77, at 233-34 (noting that U.S. Attorney General Edward Bates opposed
certain judicial acts of General Butler in Virginia).
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State, with power to proceed in a summary way on petition, to enforce
specific performance, or rescind contracts, on notice to parties.' ",'9
The progressive evolution of occupation courts during the Civil War is
well-illustrated by developments in New Orleans and surrounding areas
in Louisiana. Union forces captured the city in May 1862, and the captors
suspended exisiting civil government.80 The captors immediately created
a provost marshal's court. At first, this tribunal had jurisdiction only over
. questions concerning the army, officers, soldiers, and the laws of war. s1
Within a few months, however, the provost court acquired jurisdiction
over all criminal matters and most civil causes.8s Concurrent with the operation of the provost court in New Orleans, the military commanders
revived the former parish courts of the vicinity. Most of the old judges for
these courts were disloyal and had fled the city upon its capture, so the
Union occupiers had to erect new institutions and staff them with loyal
jurists.s Three civil state courts resumed operation in November 1862,"
but their jurisdiction was strictly limited to defendants resident in the
parish of Orleans.as The provost court continued to exercise exclusive
criminal jurisdiction for all areas in Louisiana under the control of Union
forces."
Until this time, no federal court had been operating in Louisiana. At
the outbreak of the Civil War, the seceding states disbanded all federal
courts in their territories." Once Union forces recovered a large swath of
territory in Louisiana, it was time to revive the federal courts there. Additional problems arose, however, concerning the provost court's extended
jurisdiction over criminal matters outside of New Orleans parish and over
the fact that no civil court was available to areas under Union control,
79. Scott v. Billgerry, 40 Miss. 119, 131 (1866) (quoting a commission by the Governor
dated July 12, 1865). See also Fulton v. Woodman, 40 Miss. 593 (1866).
80. WILLIAM ROBINSON, JUSTICE IN GRlY: A HISTORY OP THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF THE CONFEDEBATE STATES OF AMERICA 108 (1941).

81.. See Anonymous, supra note 73, at 259.
82. See id. at 259-60 (indicating that civil jurisdiction extended to injunctions, divorce
decrees, administration of estates, and the appointment of guardians and trustees); ROBINSON, supra note 80, at 108. See also Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Union Bank, 89 U.S. (22
Wall.) 276, 277 (1874) (for more details on the creation of this court).
83. See Anonymous, supra note 73, at 260-62; ROBINSON, supra note 80, at 108-09.
84. See Anonymous, supra note 73, at 262.
85. Id.; see also Pennywit v. Eaton, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 383, 384 (1872) (appointment of a
judge to the Fourth District Court in New Orleans); Handlin v. Wickliffe, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
173, 174-75 (1870) (appointment of a judge to the Third District Court in New Orleans);
Lanfear v. Mestier, 18 La. Ann. 497, 498 (1866) (noting that Fifth District Court for the
Parish of Orleans was left vacant).
86. See Anonymous, supra note 73, at 262; ROBINSON, supra note 80, at 109.
87. See Erwin Surrency, Documents: The ProvisionalCourt in Louisiana, 2 AM. J. LEG.
HIST. 86 (1958).

842

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

except inside the Crescent City." The solution was the creation of an entirely sui generis tribunal, the United States Provisional Court for the
State of Louisiana.
President Lincoln signed an Executive Order to establish the Provisional Court on October 20, 1862.9 The Order provided in pertinent part:
The insurrection which has for some time prevailed in several of the
States of this Union, including Louisiana, having temporarily subverted
and swept away the civil institutions of that State, including the judiciary and the judicial authorities of the Union, so that it has become necessary to hold the State in military occupation; and it being indispensibly
necessary that there shall be some judicial tribunal existing there capable
of administering justice,. . . I do hereby constitute a Provisional Court,
which shall be a court of record for the State of Louisiana, and I do
hereby appoint Charles A. Peabody, of New York, to be a provisional
judge to hold said court, with authority to hear, try, and determine, all
causes, civil and criminal, including causes in law, equity, revenue, and
admiralty, and particularly all such powers and jurisdiction as belong to
the District and Circuit Courts of the United States, conforming his proceedings, so far as possible, to the course of proceedings and practice
which has been customary in the courts of the United States and Louisiana; His judgment to be final and conclusive .... [This appointment is)
to continue during the pleasure of the President, not extending beyond
the military occupation of the city of New Orleans, or the restoration of
the civil authority in that city and in the State of Louisiana. 0
This grant of authority has been called remarkable, encompassing the
broadest possible powers,"1 and indeed it was. Lincoln intended the Provisional Court to have jurisdiction over both state and federal matters, as
indicated by the Order's reference to "all causes" and its incorporation of
the principles of Louisiana practice. 9 Not so apparent from the terms of
88. See ROBINSON, supra note 80, at 109; Anonymous, supra note 73, at 264-65.
89. Burke v. Miltenberger, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 519 (1873).
90. Id. at 519-20; see also United States v. Reiter, 27 F. Cas. 768, 770 (Prov. Ct. La.

1865) (No. 16,146); WILLIAM WHITING, WAR POWERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 285 (1871); Surrency, supra note 87, at 88; Anonymous, United States Provisional
Court for the State of Louisiana, 4 AM. L, REG. (n.s.) 65, 68 (Dec. 1864) [hereinafter Provisional Court].
91. See ROBINSON, supra note 80, at 109; Surrency, supra note 87, at 87.

92. A contemporary writer noted that the Provisional Court was a:
central court... with powers to bring litigants to itself wherever held, and whose
operations practically would expand and contract with the flow and ebb of our
army ....
The wants of the state, not only as to matters formerly within the
cognisance of state courts, but also as to those within the cognisance of the Fed*eral courts throughout the state, embracing the Eastern and Western Judicial Districts of Louisiana, the Provisional Court was well calculated to supply.
Anonymous, supra note 73, at 264-65. See also Provisional Court, supra note 90, at 73.
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the Executive Order, the President intended the Provisional Court to act
as a court of appeal for civil matters heard outside of the parish. In addition, the court acquired competence over cases that had been pending
before the old federal district and circuit courts before the outbreak of
the rebellion."
For a time, these three executive courts operated concurrently in New
Orleans, building a bewildering web of jurisdictions." To make matters
even more complicated, the United States District Court was re-established at New Orleans in May 1863 to hear prize cases," the one type of
action that the Provisional Court excluded from its remit."s That left a
gap in the authority of the occupation courts at New Orleans. Technically, appeals from the three civil parish courts were to be directed to the
Louisiana Supreme Court, then being held behind the Confederate lines
at Baton Rouge, which resulted in judgments being delayed from final
execution.97 To remedy this, Judge Peabody of the Provisional Court ordered, in January 1863, the transfer of all cases before the Louisiana Supreme Court to his own tribunal." A few months later, the military governor for the Union-occupied areas of Louisiana simply constituted a new
Supreme Court to sit in New Orleans. Judge Peabody was appointed as
chief justice, and two associate justices were named." Fortunately, at the
end of hostilities and the forming of a new reconstruction government,
this patchwork system of justice was dismantled in Louisiana-as elsewhere in the occupied areas of the South-and the former system of federal and state courts resumed operation. Congress formally concluded the
93. See ProvisionalCourt, supra note 90, at 69. The transfer of cases from the Circuit
Court to the Provisional Court provided the procedural predicate for The Grapeshot, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 563 (1868), later proceeding, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 129 (1869), in which the Supreme Court passed squarely-for the first time-on the constitutional legitimacy of occupation courts. For a contemporary criticism of the creation of the Provisional Court and its
assumption of the powers of the former District and Circuit courts, see Anonymous, The
Authority of the "ProvisionalCourt" of Louisiana,4 AM. L. REG. (n.s.) 385, 388 (May 1865)
(an article by the pseudonynomous "B" of New Haven, Connecticut).
94. Because of the creation of the Provisional Court, much of the work of the provost
court was limited-once again-to military personnel and infractions. Anonymous, supra
note 73, at 267. Indeed, for a short time Judge Peabody of the Provisional Court also acted
as provost judge. Id.
95. See 1 F. Cas. at xxi (table of judges, indicating the appointment of Edward H.
Durell).
96. See ROBINSON, supra note 80, at 109-110; Surrency, supra note 87, at 87. For more
on this particular limitation, a legacy of the Supreme Court's decision in Jecker v. Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498 (1851), see infra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
97. Anonymous, supra note 73, at 266.
98. ROBINSON, supra note 80, at 110 (also noting that at least one case was appealed
secretly to the Supreme Court holding session in Confederate territory).
99. See id. at 110-11; Anonymous, supra note 73, at 266.
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affairs of the Provisional Court in Louisiana in July 1866, and transferred
its cases back to the appropriate federal district and circuit benches,
while extending official recognition to the Provisional Court's
judgments. 0 0
C.

The Spanish-American War

Nearly forty years elapsed before the United States created the next
Article II court. When the United States conquered Puerto Rico during
the Spanish-American War, little time was lost in creating a new judicial
system for the island.10 1 General Davis, the military governor, established
a Provisional Court on June 27, 1899, just two months after the United
States concluded a treaty of peace with the Spanish government ceding
the island to the United States.102
General Order Number 88, which General Davis issued to constitute
the court after he had received presidential authorization,108 was more
carefully crafted than the executive order creating the Louisiana Provisional Court during the Civil War.1 0' The jurisdiction of the Puerto Rican
court was limited to those cases "which would be properly cognizable by
the circuit or district courts of the United States,"'' as well as an enumerated list of criminal infractions or offenses.10 6 The order limited the
civil jurisdiction of the Provisional Court to matters in which the amount
100. See Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 310, 14 Stat. 344. See also Edwards v. Tanneret, 79
U.S. (12 Wall.) 446, 449-50 (1870) (construing the Act as not granting any additional jurisdiction to the district or circuit courts when cases were transferred from the Provisional
Court).

101. See CARMELO DELGADO CINTR6N, DERECHO Y COLONIALISMO: LA TRAYECTORIA HIST6RICA DEL DERECHO PUERTORRIQUERO 171-73 (1988); CHARLES MAGOON, REPORTS ON THE
LAW OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT INTERRITORY SUBJECT TO MILITARY OCCUPATION BY THE MILITARY
FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES 19-34 (1902) (providing a contemporary account).
102. See Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 263-64 (1909).
103. See Santiago v. Nogueras, 2 P.R. Fed. R. 467, 474 (D.P.R. 1907).
104. The full text of the Order is reprinted in Santiago, 2 P.R. Fed. R., at 489-91. Excerpts appear in Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 264-65 (1909).
105. General Order No. 88 (June 27, 1899), § 2, reprinted in Santiago v. Nogueras, 2
P.R. Fed. R. 467, 489-91 (D.P.R. 1907).
106. General Order No. 88 (June 27, 1899), § 2. The enumerated criminal acts included:
(1) All offenses punishable under, the statutory laws of the United States ....;
(2) offenses committed by or against persons, foreigners or Americans, not residents of this department, but who may be travelling or temporarily sojourning
therein, or against the property of nonresidents; (3) offenses against the person or
property of persons belonging to the Army or Navy, or those committed by persons belonging to the Army or Navy, not properly triable by military or naval
courts; but not including minor police offenses; (4) offenses committed by or
against foreigners or by or against citizens of another state, district, or territory of
the United States, residing in this department.

Id. § 8.
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in controversy exceeded fifty dollars, or in which non-Puerto Ricans were
involved, or which were submitted by stipulation of the parties.107 Notably, appeal of the Provisional Court's decisions to the United States Supreme Court was allowed by writ of certiorari.108
The Puerto Rico provisional court was plainly constituted as a federal
tribunal. Unlike the Louisiana court, the President did not intend it to
supplant the authority of local institutions. The pre-existing tribunals on
Puerto Rico were reformed a few months after the Provisional Court was
established, but they operated thereafter as a distinct judicial system.10 9
The Provisional Court continued its operations until the Foraker Act of
April 1900 established a Federal District Court on the island.1 0 Judge
Rodney, of the District Court, later noted that he was "not informed as to
how much litigation was tried before th[e] provisional court during its
eight or nine months of existence, but it is said to have been quite considerable." ' When created by Act of Congress, the Federal District Court
in Puerto Rico became an Article I court for the territory so organized.
The new District Court was recognized as the legal successor to the Provisional Court."'
D.

The Second World War

The remaining three executive courts were created in the aftermath of
the Second World War to provide justice to German and Japanese territories occupied by the United States. Of these three, by far the largest in
terms of volume of cases heard was that established in the Americanoccupied sector of Germany. Immediately after the surrender, United
States armed forces established a system of Military Government
Courts." 8 These courts had jurisdiction "over all persons in the occupied
territory," except for Allied armed forces, their dependents, and civilian
officials, for "[a]ll offenses against the laws and usages of war[,J .. .[a]ll
107. Id. § 10. General Order 88 also provided that cases "arising under article 11 of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain" would be judged under procedures
provided therein. Id. § 9. This was a reference to cases pending in Puerto Rican courts, or
on appeal to the Supreme Court of Spain. See Treaty of Peace, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain,
art. XI, 30 Stat. 1754.
108. General Order No. 88 (June 27, 1899), § 11 reprinted in Santiago v. Nogueras, 2
P.R. Fed. R. 467, 489-91 (D.P.R. 1907). See infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text.
109. See Santiago v. Nogueras, 2 P.R. Fed. R. 467, 479 (D.P.R. 1907) (referring to General Order No. 118, issued on August 16, 1899, creating new local judicial system).
110. Act of Apr. 12, 1900, ch. 191, § 34, 31 Stat. 77, 84. See also CINrTR6N, supra note
101, at 172-73.
111. Santiago v. Nogueras, 2 P.R. Fed. R. 467, 486 (D.P.R. 1907).
112. Act of Apr. 12, 1900, ch. 191, § 34, 31 Stat. 85.
113. See generally Eli E. Nobleman, American Military Government Courts in Germany, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 803 (1946).
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offenses under any proclamation, law, ordinance, notice or order issued by
or under the authority of the Military Government or of the Allied
Forces, [and] [a]ll offenses under the laws of the occupied territory or of
any part thereof."' ' These courts, with exclusively criminal jurisdiction,
carried out their functions until 1949.115 In that year, they were shifted
from a military to a civilian footing. The new tribunals were called the
United States Courts of the Allied High Commmission, under the aegis of
the State Department and manned exclusively with civilian jurists, prosecutors, and officials. 1 The criminal jurisdiction of the new courts was
quite broad, including cases arising under both occupation and German
law if the offense was committed in the American sector. 17 Civil jurisdiction was confirmed as extending to all cases in which a member of the
United States armed forces, a dependent, or a civilian official, was a
party.118 When the Federal Republic of Germany assumed its sovereignty,
the Allied High Commission Courts were disbanded.11 9
Even after the occupation of West Germany ended, Allied forces remained in control of Berlin. 20 The American sector of Berlin thus continued under an occupation regime, to deter Soviet aggression. 21 Law Number 7, promulgated by the Allied Kommandatura on March 17, 1950,
114. United States Military Government, Ordinance No. 2, Military Government Courts,
12 Fed. Reg. 2189, 2190-91 (1947).
115. In August 1948, pursuant to Military Government Ordinance No. 31, 14 Fed. Reg.
124 (1949), this system was reorganized around eleven judicial districts, id. art. 3, and a
court of appeals. Id. art. 4.
116. See William Clark & Thomas Goodman, American Justice in Occupied Germany:
United States Military Government Courts, 36 A.B.A. J. 443, 444 (1950).
117. Allied High Commission, Law No. 1, 15 Fed. Reg. 2086 (1950).
118. Id. See also Clark & Goodman, supra note 116, at 446 (describing civil jurisdiction
exercised by former Military Government Courts).
119. The occupation regime officially ended on May 5, 1955, with the entry into force of
the Bonn Conventions between the Federal Republic of Germany and the three western
occupying powers (France, Britain, and the United States). Convention on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of Germany, May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4251,
331 U.N.T.S. 327; Convention on the Settlement of Matters Arising Out of the War and the
Occupation, May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4411, 332 U.N.T.S. 219; Protocol on the Termination of
the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 4117,
331 U.N.T.S. 253. See also United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 229-35 (U.S. Ct. Berlin
1979) (for a narrative history of the American occupation courts in Germany). See also In re
Kraussman, 130 F. Supp. 926 (D. Conn. 1955) (regarding subsequent attempt to extradite
an individual to .the custody of the High Commission Courts; request denied).
120. See Tripartite Agreement on the Exercise of Retained Rights in Germany, Oct. 23,
1954, U.S.-U.K.-Fr., 6 U.S.T. 5703, T.I.A.S. No. 3427 (including among these retained rights
the appointment of an Allied Kommandatura to. occupy the four sectors of Berlin).
121. President Eisenhower assigned in 1955 responsibility for the occupation of Berlin to
the United States ambassador in Bonn. See Exec. Order No. 10608, 20 Fed. Reg. 3093
(1955). For more on the operations of the Allied occupation of Berlin, see generally I. HENDRY & M. WooD, THE LEGAL STATUS OF BERLIN (1987).
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established the legal immunities of the occupation forces in the western
Berlin sectors. 122 Law Number 7 declared that German courts in Berlin
had no jurisdiction over Allied, forces,"2 ' nor over any acts arising from
the occupation, except when specifically authorized by the Allied Kommandatura or a respective sector commander.12 4 Thus, the Kommandatura had the power to decide what was, and was not, within the
competence of the local German courts, and, in extraordinary circumstances, to withdraw the matter from their jurisdiction. 12 ' This last provision was coupled with the ability of the occupiers to establish their own
courts to handle these reserved matters.
The U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, in Law Number 46 of April
28, 1955, created the United States Court for Berlin.2 Although the
Kommandatura Law Number 7 contained no bar to civil jurisdiction,127
the mandate of the United States Court for Berlin was strictly limited by
12s
its own statute to criminal cases within the American sector of the city.
The judge for the United States Court in Berlin, and all other court officers, served at the pleasure of the Ambassador in Bonn,12 9 and only the
Ambassador, himself, could review the court's decisions.130 Unlike the
American courts in West Germany, which decided (by one reckoning)
over 600,000 cases before they disbanded in 1955,131 the United States
122. Allied Kommandatura, Law No. 7, Judicial Powers in the Reserved Fields, Mar. 17,

1950, ALLIED KOMMANDATURA GAZETE [hereinafter "AK GAzErrE"] 11 (1950-53), as
amended by Law No. 17, Aug. 21, 1951, AK GAZvrE 382, discussed in HENDRY & WOOD,
supra note 121, at 65-67.
123. Allied Kommandatura Law No. 2, Feb. 9, 1950, AK GAZETrE 4, cited in HENDRY &
WOOD, supra note 121, at 65 n.35 (defining the term "Allied forces" as the Occupation Authorities, Occupation Forces and their members; members of the families and non-German
persons in the service of persons in the foregoing catgeories; and non-German persons whose
presence in Berlin was deemed necessary for the purposes of the occupation.). HENDRY &
WOOD, supra note 121, at 65 n.35.
124. See Law No. 7, supra note 122, arts. 1, 2 (discussed in HENDRY & WOOD, supra note
121, at 65-66).
125. Id. arts. 3, 7, 10.
126. High Commissioner Law No. 46, Apr. 28, 1955, AK GAZETrE 1056, reprinted in
United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 261-65 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979).
127. See Law No. 7, supra note 122, arts. 1, 2 (discussed in HENDRY & WOOD, supra note
121, at 65-66).
128. See Law No. 46, supra note 126, art. 3, para. 1 (reprinted in United States v. Tiede,
86 F.R.D. at 263) ("[T]he Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and decide any criminal case arising under any legislation in effect in the United States Sector of Berlin if the
offense was committed within the area of Greater Berlin").
129. Id. art. 2, para. 5 (reprinted in United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. at 262).
130. Id. art. 5 (reprinted in United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. at 264).
131. Worth B. McCauley, American Courts in Germany: 600,000 Cases Later, 40 A.BA.
J. 1041, 1041-42 (1954).
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Court for Berlin sat for only one matter, United States v. Tiede, 2 just
over twelve years ago in 1979. With the recent reunification of Germany,
the United States, along with the rest of the Allied powers, abandoned
their occupation of Berlin, thus
also ending the limited life of the United
88
States Court for that city.

In the Pacific, the United States took Okinawa in the last battle of the
war with Japan. In the ensuing Peace Treaty, Japan gave the United
States the right "to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory" encompassing the Ryukyu Islands
and Okinawa. 13" The Executive Order that provided for the administration of the Ryukyu Islands 35 established a two-tiered judicial system in a
fashion that closely paralleled the occupation regime in Puerto Rico."'
The lower tier was a local court system with general civil jurisdiction and
criminal jurisdiction limited to Ryukyuan natives.18 7 The upper tier was a
Civil Administration Court system, with both trial and appellate levels 8
that granted civil jurisdiction over "case[s] or controvers[ies] of particular
importance affecting the security, property, or interests of the United
States,"'8 39 and cases in which American nationals were parties. 140 The

Civil Administration Courts also had criminal jurisdiction over United
States nationals employed by the occupiers,"" and over offenses affecting
the security, property, or interests of the United States. 4' These courts
132. 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979).
133. See Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, art. 7,
para. 1, reprintedin 29 I.L.M. 1186; Agreement on the Settlement of Certain Matters Relating to Berlin, Sept. 25, 1990, arts. 3 & 4, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 445. See also Michael
Young, The Legal Aspects of German Unification, 1 FOREIGN POLICY BULL. OF U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE (No. 2) 83 (Sept./Oct. 1990).
134. Treaty of Peace with Japan, Apr. 28, 1952, art. 3, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 3173, 136 U.N.T.S.
45, 50.
135. Exec. Order No. 10713, 22 Fed. Reg. 4007 (1957).
136. See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text. See also B.J. George, Jr., The
United States in the Ryukyus: The Insular Cases Revived, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 785, 785-94
(1964) (for more on the system of government for the Ryukyus under U.S. occupation).
137. Exec. Order No. 10713, § 10(a), 22 Fed. Reg. 4007.
138. Id. § 10(d).
139. Id. § 10(b)(1).
140. Id. § 10(b)(2).
141. Id. § 10(b)(3). This provision was later amended by Exec. Order No. 11010, 27 Fed.
Reg. 2621 (1962), which extended the criminal jurisdiction of the Civil Administration
Courts to "(a) the civilian component, (b) employees of the United States Government who
are United States nationals, and (c) dependents, excluding Ryukyuans, (i) of the foregoing
and (ii) of members of the United States forces." Id. § 2(2).
142. Exec. Order No. 10713, § 10(b)(4), 22 Fed. Reg. 4007.
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operated until the United States returned Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands to Japan in 1971.1 8
As conceded above, other Article II courts may have existed, but have
escaped the notice of this writer. In some instances, other authorities
have referred to them,144 but I have found no other evidence of their operations. Since the focus of this Article is on the placement of executive
courts in the constitutional order, complete historical coverage is neither
necessary nor desirable. Indeed, the remaining sections of this Article focus chiefly on those occupation tribunals that left a legacy of constitutional interpretation. In short, the object here is not to recite the historical provenance of these anomalous courts, but rather to chart their
jurisprudence.
III.

A.

LIMITS ON THE OPERATION OF ARTICLE

II

COURTS

ConstitutionalProblems Raised by Occupations

Executive courts were a phenomenon closely associated with the occupation of enemy territory by American troops. Because military occupation invariably entailed the replacement of one sovereign with another,
American jurists were particularly sensitive to the constitutional implications of this presidential war-making power. Our first experiences of occu143. See Agreement Concerning the Ryukyu and the Daito Islands, June 17, 1971, Japan-U.S., 23 U.S.T. 446. See also United States ex rel. Jacobs v. Froehlke, 334 F. Supp.
1107, 1109 (D.D.C. 1971).
144. See, e.g., Clark & Goodman, supra note 116, at 443 (who refer to "military tribunals" established in Cuba and the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, at Tampico
in the 1916 campaign against Pancho Villa, and in the Rhineland after World War I, but do
not indicate if these were truly occupation courts, as that term is used here). See Robert
Ireton, The Rhineland Commission at Work, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 460, 466-68 (1923) (providing more on the international commission occupying the Rhineland and its judicial activi-

ties);

MELGUIADES

J. GAMBOA,

AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILIPPINE LAW

72 (7th ed. 1969) (indi-

cating that the American occupiers of the Philippines in 1898 continued the operation of
pre-existing tribunals); W. THOMPSON, THE INTRODUCTION OF AMERICAN LAw IN THE PHILIPPINES AND PUERTO Rico, 1898-1905 14-19 (1989) (noting that a provost court was established
in the Philippines to try criminal offenses, but this was before the Treaty of Peace of December 10, 1898; civil jurisdiction was vested in a revived audiencia territorial, as the Supreme Court of the Philippines). It is also interesting to note that the courts of the Commonwealth of the Philippines recognized the rights of the Japanese occupiers in World War
Two to establish criminal courts. See Peralta v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 285, 296-98
(1945).
During the second occupation of Cuba, a military, commission was created to try two
soldiers charged with murdering some native people. See S. REP. No. 229, 63d Cong., 2d
Sess. 53, 98-99 (1912) (testimony of General Crowder), reprintedin Madsen v. Kinsella, 343
U.S. 341, 354 n.20 (1952). See also Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 118 (1901) (indicating the
establishment of a Supreme Court in Cuba, with both civil and criminal jurisdiction, coopting the previous colonial institution).
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pation, arising from the American Revolution and the War of 1812, were,
of course, quite negative. 45 In the aftermath of that later conflict, the
Supreme Court had to concede that land occupied by British forces, most
notably large swaths of territory in Maine, had been temporarily lost by
the United States and the government could not, even when sovereignty
had been restored, impose customs regulations retroactively during the
time of the occupation.14 ' The Court concluded that:

[t]he sovereignty of the United States over the territory was, of course,
suspended, and the laws of the United States could no longer be rightfully enforced there, or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained
and submitted to the conquerors. By the surrender, the inhabitants
passed under a temporary allegiance to the British government, and were
bound by such laws, and such only, as it chose to recognise and
impose. 47

The phenomenon of military occupation was soon observed in the
events following the acquisition of Florida from Spain. Although Spain
ceded that territory to the United States and thus the territory was no
longer subject to conquest,"18 Chief Justice Marshall, writing in the case
of American Insurance Co. v. Canter,'" assimilated the two conditions
for constitutional purposes:
The Constitution confers absolutely on the government of the Union, the
powers of making war, and of making treaties; consequently, that government possesses the power of acquiring territory, either by conquest or by
treaty.
The usage of the world is, if a nation be not entirely subdued, to consider the holding of conquered territory as a mere military occupation,
until its fate shall be determined at the treaty of peace. If it be ceded by
the treaty, the acquisition is confirmed, and the ceded territory becomes
a part of the nation to which it is annexed. .... 150

Chief Justice Marshall was careful to distinguish the war-making from
the treaty power, but the clear import of this passage is that the President, as commander in chief, could govern areas under belligerent occupation subject to the dictates of a later treaty of peace and an act of
Congress organizing the territory.
145. See, e.g., FREDERICK B. WIENER, CIVILIANS UNDER MILITARY JUSTICE: THE BRITISH
PRACTICE SINCE 1689 ESPECIALLY IN NORTH AMEmCA (1971).

146. See United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 246 (1819).
147. Id. at 254 (Story, J.).

148. See Treaty of Cession, Feb. 22, 1819, U.S.-Spain, 8 Stat. 252.
149. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.

150. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 541.
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The real importance of this holding would only be realized in the Mexican War, which, not uncoincidentally, saw the first appearance of an Article II court to provide justice in occupied regions.151 In its consideration
of whether the President, through military commanders on the scene in
newly-conquered California, could impose import and tonnage duties on
goods,153 the Supreme Court held that:
the President, as constitutional commander-in-chief of the army and
navy, authorized the military and naval commander of our forces in California to exercise the belligerent rights of a conqueror, and to form a civil
government for the conquered territory, and to impose duties on imports
and tonnage as military contributions for the support of the government,
and of the army which had the conquest in possession .... No one can

doubt that these orders of the President, and the action of our army and
navy commander in California, in conformity with them, was according
to the law of arms and the right of conquest, or that they were operative
until the ratification and exchange of the peace treaty. 153
This passage contains the essential jurisprudence of military occupa-.
tion that the Supreme Court would apply to the present day. First, the
President, by virtue of his war-making powers under Article II, may govern regions subject to belligerent occupation. Second, it is implicit that
the President substantially delegates to his army and navy commanders
the responsibility for the actual conduct of the military government.
Third, no apparent restrictions force the President, or his commanders,
to conduct the belligerent occupation in a particular fashion. Fourth, at
some point the occupation must come to an end-presumably, but not
necessarily, by the conclusion of hostilities-and, at that time, the President's exclusive and unfettered powers of military occupation should
lapse.
Obviously, the creation of courts with civil jurisdiction, or of criminal
jurisdiction over civilians, is just one relatively minor aspect of a belligerent occupation. An occupier under today's laws of war has the duty to
"take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country."' 5 4 Although the question
151. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
152. These facts presented precisely the opposite pattern as those in United States v.
Rice, 17 U.S. (4 What.) 246 (1819), the case that arose from the War of 1812. See also Ho
Tung & Co. v. United States, 42 Ct. Cl. 213 (1907) (examining the same issue regarding
occupation of Philippines in 1898).
153. Cross v. Harrison, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 164, 189 (1853) (Wayne, J.).
154. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, ch. 5,
sec. III, art. 43, 36 Stat. 2277. "Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed
under the authority of the hostile army." Id. art. 42. See also Convention Respecting the
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whether the military occupier is obliged to observe the laws already in
force in the territory has been hotly disputed by the authorities,", no
doubt exists that law and order must be provided for and, as a corollary,
that courts of justice be made available to the population. It was recognized at an early juncture in American practice that a provisional military
government should be vested with executive, legislative, and judicial powers;"' although, owing to military necessity, these powers usually could
not be separated into different institutions exercising checks and balances
on each other.
The issue of the creation of occupation courts, particularly those endowed with civil jurisdiction, was seemingly settled in the aftermath of
the Civil War when the judgments issued by these tribunals were vigorously attacked. The facts of Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Union
Bank" 7 were illustrative of the patterns presented by these cases. The
Provost Court in New Orleans issued a judgment, apparently upon the
orders of the commanding Union officer there, in which a loan between
the two banks was repayable in the lawful money of the United States,
and not the Confederate notes that were originally tendered. The aggrieved bank argued, after the War and initially before the Louisiana Supreme Court, that the Provost Court could not properly exercise civil jurisdiction under the Constitution.'5 8 The Louisiana Supreme Court held
that because "[als an incident of war powers the President ha[s] the right
to establish civil government, [and] to create courts to protect the lives
and the property of the people," it followed that courts with civil jurisdiction could be established."'
The United States Supreme Court affirmed, and made a valiant attempt to offer some guidance in this area of jurisprudence.''0 For the first
Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, T.S. No. 403; D. GRABER,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION (1949); Elbridge Colby, Occu-

pation under the Laws of War (pt. 1), 25 COLUM. L. REV. 904 (1925); Elbridge Colby, Occupation Under the Laws of War (pt. 2), 26 COLUM. L. REV. 146 (1926).

155. As noted above, early Supreme Court decisions, see, e.g., American Ins. Co. v.
Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 541-42 (1828); United States v. Rice, 17 U.S. (4 What.) 246, 254
(1819), tended to permit the occupier to adopt whatever laws it chose for occupied areas.
The requirement of administering occupied territory according to the laws of the defeated
state is sometimes impossible to meet, owing not only to the breakdown of all authority, but
also to the desire sometimes to eliminate all vestiges of the enemy's laws, as was the case in
the defeat of Nazi Germany. See Edmund H. Schwenk, Legislative Power of the Military
Occupant under Article 43, Hague Regulations, 54 YALE L.J. 393 (1945); Comment, The
Law of Belligerent Occupation in the American Courts, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1066 (1952).
156. See Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 1 N.M. (Gild.) 34, 43 (1853).
157. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 276 (1874), aff'g 25 La. Ann. 387 (1873).
158. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) at 277-78.
159. 25 La. Ann. at 388-89 (Wyly, J.).
160. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) at 295.
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time, the Court articulated, albeit imperfectly, the distinction between
executive tribunals and Article III tribunals. Justice Strong simply noted
that Article III "has no application to the abnormal condition of conquered territory in the occupancy of the conquering army." 16 1 He also
correctly identified one factor distinguishing an Article II court: they were
created without Congressional action. 1 2 The Court then located the
source of constitutional authority for occupation courts in the President's
war powers and the "exercise of the ordinary rights of conquest." 16"This,
too, was an essential part of the definition for a presidential court.
But Justice Strong misstepped in a remark he made, almost as an
aside, in holding against the application of Article III strictures to these
tribunals. Article III, he wrote, "refers only to the courts of the United
States, which military courts are not. 1'4 As discussed above, 1" courtsmartial and military tribunals are, indeed, courts of the United States,
and are sanctioned either under Article I of the Constitution or under the
laws of war. Only those tribunals constituted under strictly international
authority have been denied status as courts of the United States.1" Justice Strong was thus mistaken in denying recognition to Article I and Article II courts.
Most Civil War era jurists, when faced with an argument of an occupation court's unconstitutionality, tended to place faith in an expansive
construct of presidential power only partially restrained by the laws of
war and virtually unfettered by judicial review or Congressional action.
Particularly revealing in this regard are the opinions of the judges actually sitting on these tribunals. One such decision is extant. Judge
Peabody, as judge of the Provisional Court of Louisiana, was faced with a
head-on challenge to his authority in United States v. Reiter, s7 a criminal prosecution of two defendants charged with serious crimes that had
no adverse impact on the military occupation in New Orleans."
Judge Peabody instantly conceded that the court over which he presided "was quite out of the usual course and novel. It has not its origin or
foundation in any constitutional or legislative enactment-[it] is not the
161. Id.
162. Id. at 296.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 295.
165. See supra notes 37-55 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
167. 27 F. Cas. 768 (Prov. Ct. La. 1865) (No. 16,146). The other regularly-reported decision of this court is of little interest to constitutional scholars. Union Bank v. New Orleans,
24 F. Cas. 550 (Prov. Ct. La. 1866)(No. 14,351).
168. 27 F. Cas. at 769 (noting that the crimes were, under the laws of Louisiana, punishable by death).
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creature of any regularly-organized constitutional or legislative body."'"
In short, neither Article I nor Article III of the Constitution sanctioned
the Provisional Court. Instead, it was observed that the tribunal "depends for its existence on the law of nations, and on that part of the law
of nations relating to war. .. .
This being stipulated, all that remained was to link the rights granted
to belligerent occupiers with the exercise of presidential power. Judge
Peabody elegantly made this connection:
So the government of the United States, having conquered and expelled
from the territory or country, theretofore known as the state of Louisiana, the power by which the government of it had been theretofore administered, and having established there its own power, was bound by
the laws of war, as well as the dictates of humanity, to give to the territory thus bereft a government in the place and stead of the one deposed
or overthrown, such a[] one as should reasonably secure the safety and
welfare of the people thus reduced to subjection; in some manner, not
inconsistent, to be sure, with the proper interests of the governing power,
and the maintenance of it in its supremacy there. The power established
there was the military power of the United States, and the president of
the United States ....

the commander-in-chief of the forces, military

and naval, of the United States, was at the head of that power, and had
the right and duty to exercise and direct it. It was incumbent on him,
representing for this purpose the sovereignty of the United States, to see
that the duty devolving on his government should be properly performed. He acted in obedience to this duty, and in accordance with this
right, when he attempted to establish there a judicial tribunal capable of
deciding controversies and administering justice.17 '
This passage is quoted at length because it explicates the essential jurisprudential basis for occupation courts. Once the connection was made
between the dictates of the laws of war and the powers bestowed upon
the President by Article II of the Constitution, the justification for executive tribunals necessarily followed. Moreover, this rationale remained applicable no matter the actual political conditions of the occupation. It
made no difference, for example, that the Confederate states were not
foreign territory newly occupied by American forces. The right of belligerent occupation extended to the suppression of rebellion, and thus the
power to establish civil tribunals also attached. 72
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 771-72.
Id. at 774-76. See also New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387, 393-94

(1874); State v. Hall, 65 Tenn. (6 Bax.) 3, 9-11 (1873) (Sneed, J.) ("(It makes no difference
what these tribunals are called-whether circuit courts or civil commissions--so that they
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Opposition to the establishment of the occupation courts existed, and
not just among disgruntled rebels. One authority, writing under the pseudonym of "B" in the American Law Register of May 1865, argued that
the constitution provided no basis to establish a provisional court in Louisiana when the former federal courts had already been created and were
71 "B" also suggested
staffed with loyal jurists.7
that absolutely no constitutional authority existed authorizing the President to create courts and
vest them with civil jurisdiction over matters properly within the cognizance of state tribunals. 17 ' As time elapsed, however, few judges were willing to overturn the judgments rendered by the Union occupation courts
during the Civil War.1 75 As one Tennessee judge succinctly noted,
"[t]hese tribunals have in diverse ways been recognized by the court, and
treated as lawfully constituted tribunals. And if for no other reason, this
ought to be so upon consideration of public policy, and for the sake of
public repose. "176
The principles of jurisprudence developed during the Civil War plainly
guided later rulings on the status of Article II courts. In the aftermath of
the Spanish-American War, the Supreme Court had occasion to pass
judgment on the establishment of the Provisional Court in Puerto Rico.
This tribunal was created soon after the cession of the island by Spain. It
remained in operation for ten months until Congress acted to politically
organize the island.17 The question was presented to the Supreme Court
whether the President's occupation powers lapsed with the conclusion of
the Treaty of Peace. Justice Moody, writing for the Court in the case of
Santiago v.Nogueras,17 replied in the negative:
be constituted by competent military authority."); Hefferman v. Porter, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.)
391, 396-97 (1869); Isbell v. Farris, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 426, 428-29 (1868); Rutledge v. Fogg,
43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 554, 561 (1866) (discussing the legal status of civil commission courts
established in Nashville and Memphis).
173. ProvisionalCourt, supra note 90, at 388. See supra notes 80-97 and accompanying
text (tracing the history of the occupation courts in Louisiana).
174. Provisional Court, supra note 90, at 388.
175. But see Walt v. Thomasson, 57 Tenn. (10 Heisk.) 151 (1872); State v. Stillman, 47
Tenn. (7 Cold.) 341 (1870); see also infra notes 202-04 and accompanying text (discussing
these two cases).
176. State v. Hall, 65 Tenn. (6 Bax.) 3, 11 (1873) (Sneed, J.).
177. See supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text. General Davis, whose General Order number 88 established the Provisional Court, believed that it could only be legitimized
as an exercise of the "constitutional power of the President, as Commander in Chief of the
Army ....
to administer the affairs of territory captured or acquired through... war until
such time as Congress may assume the responsibility for legislating for conquered territories." Annual Reports of the War Department for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1900,
Report of the Military Governor of Puerto Rico.on Civil Affairs, H.R. Doc. 2, 56th Cong., 2d
Sess. 52 (1900).
178. 214 U.S. 260 (1909).
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[P]ending the action of Congress, there is no civil power under our system of government, not even that of the President as civil executive,
which can take the place of the government which has ceased to exist by
the cession. Is it possible that, under such circumstances, there must be
an interregnum? We think clearly not. The authority to govern such
ceded territory is found in the laws applicable to conquest and cession.
That authority is the military power, under the control of the President
as Commander-in-Chief. 17'
This passage touches on two essential points. First, the presidential
power to conduct a belligerent occupation is not necessarily terminated
by the conclusion of hostilities or by the exercise of Congress's treatymaking power in reaching such a peace. The authority to create and
maintain executive courts remains within the war-making power, even after the end of the war. 10 Second, the power of the President to establish
occupation courts is limited in one vital respect. Congress may act to establish a system of justice for these areas, thus ending the life of the occupation tribunals.181
After World War Two the Supreme Court addressed this last issue in
Madsen v. Kinsella ' 2 in which the applicant, after having been convicted of murdering her husband by a United States Court of the Allied
High Commission, 0 ' sought release on the ground that the Article II tribunal was unconstitutional. 4 Writing for the Court, Justice Burton
turned away this challenge after carefully explicating the respective jurisdictions of courts-martial and occupation tribunals.1 81 Yet, in what was
plainly dicta, the Court hinted at an as-yet undefined limit on presidential power in this field:
In the absence of attempts by Congress to limit the President's power,
it appears that, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States, he may, in time of war, establish and prescribe the jurisdiction and procedure of military commissions, and of tribunals in the
nature of such commissions ....
The policy of Congress to refrain from

179. Id. at 265.
180. But see the curious passage in a later case, Williamson v. Alldridge, 320 F. Supp.
840 (W.D. Okl. 1970) (Daugherty, J.) saying that the President's power in creating the civil
administration courts for the Ryukyu Islands was "conferred on him, not by the United
States Constitution, nor by Congress, but by Japan through Art. 3 of the Treaty of Peace."
Id. at 843. See supra note 134.
181. 214 U.S. at 265.
182. 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
183. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
184. 343 U.S. at 342-43.
185. Id. at 345-49.
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legislating in this uncharted area does not imply its lack of power to
TM
legislate.'
So, this last word on the constitutional power of the President to create
occupation courts is an ambivalent one.8'7 As this Article has made clear,
the historical trend, arising chiefly from the legacy of the Civil War, was
to give the President virtually unlimited power in this realm. Before the
decision in Madsen, it seems that virtually no checks and balances on
presidential authority existed, save for the affirmative act of Congress in
politically organizing, or, reorganizing, a territory under occupation. The
remaining sections of this part deal, however, with some jurisprudential
limits placed by courts on the establishment, powers, and duration of executive tribunals. These operational restraints were quite weak, particularly when compared with the already generous grant of executive power
in this area.
B.

Problems of Delegation, Jurisdiction,and Duration

The question of who could exercise executive power to create an occupation court was never an issue when the President's action was clear and
express. With some occupation tribunals, most notably the Louisiana
Provisional Court 8 8 and the Ryukyu Islands Civil Administration
courts,1 89 the order came directly from the White House. In other instances, presidential appproval came in advance of the commanding officer's order establishing such courts as the prize court at Monterey,'19 the
Puerto Rico Provisional Court,'' and the United States Court for
19 2
Berlin.
But a number of cases exist in which a local military commander created an occupation tribunal and no presidential authorization was later
forthcoming. Earlier precedents tended to raise a grave presumption
against civil courts erected by military commanders. 1 s To overcome this
presumption, and to accommodate unreliable communications during

18. Id. at 348-49.
187. The future importance of the Madsen dicta is, however, discussed infra note 340
and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
190. See Jecker v; Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498, 512 (1851).
191. See Santiago v. Nogueras, 2 P.R. Fed. R. 467, 474 (D.P.R. 1907).
192. See supra notes 126-33 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Snell v. Faussatt, 22 F. Cas. 714, 716 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 13,138) (questioning the legality of a prize when the prize tribunal was irregularly constituted by a local
military commander).
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wartime, some authorities preferred a rule that granted senior military
commanders the discretion to establish presidential tribunals.1"
This issue rarely proved embarassing because American military authorities, particularly the Judge Advocate General corps, quickly disavowed the proceedings of courts irregularly constituted by inferior military officers. The Attorney General, in two opinions issued in 1864 and
1865,195 repudiated the decisions of General Saxton's Provisional Court in
South Carolina.'" Attorney General James Speed went to great lengths to
delimit the powers of local military commanders operating within the
Confederacy, and sought to refute the analogy of powers granted to General Kearney in New Mexico and Colonel Mason in California during the
197 He concluded,
Mexican W r.
rather pungently, that "[c]learly, then, if
any officer in the department was authorized to establish courts of justice
to decide civil controversies between citizens of the United States temporarily in the limits of the department, that officer was not General
Saxton."'"
The issue of the proper delegation of presidential authority was particularly acute concerning the civil commission courts established in Tennessee during the Civil War.'" When the Supreme Court of Tennessee
later scrutinized their judgments, it reached various conclusions on
whether those tribunals had been properly constituted. In its first consideration of the question, in Hefferman v. Porter,200 the Tennessee Supreme Court focused exclusively on whether the President, as a general
matter, had the authority to create an occupation tribunal, and not
whether that authority had been properly delegated.201 But when the
question arose again, three years later in Walt v. Thomasson,201 the court,
citing two decisions of Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt in 1863,2*3
held that although the commander of an occupation district had the
194. See WINTHROP, supra note 74, at 804-05.
195. 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 86 (1864); 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 149 (1865).
196. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
197. See 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 149, 155.
198. Id. at 154.
199. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
200. 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 391 (1869) (Ellett, Special Judge).
201. Id. at 393-400.
202. 57 Tenn. (10 Heisk.) 151 (1872) (Nicholson, C.J.).
203. See id. at 157-58 (quoting the cases of Able and Orgill, in which the Judge Advocate
referred to the civil commission court at Memphis as "'an anomalous and irregular tribunal,
entirely unauthorized by military law'" and that its exercise of civil jurisdiction was "'unwarranted by law or usage, and [its] action has become highly deterimental to the service
and to the public welfare.' ").
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power to create a military commission, he did not have the authority,
04
save with explicit presidential approval, to grant it civil jurisdiction.
Precisely the same issue arose in regard to the Provost Court at New
Orleans, the first occupation tribunal established in that city with the arrival of Union troops.'"5 In Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Union
Bank,2s" one of theissues raised by the financial institution compelled by
the Provost Court to repay a debt, concerned whether General Butler had
insufficient authority, acting alone, to endow that tribunal with competence over strictly civil matters.'"r The United States Supreme Court simply ruled that General Butler had the power to constitute the Provost
Court, and whether it could take cognizance of civil matters was a question of state law,'" s which the Louisiana Supreme Court had already decided in the affirmative.' 09
Justice Strong's denial that the federal constitution established occupation courts has already been critiqued above, 10 but his application of
state law in the determination of an executive court's jurisdiction appeared to be a far more grieveous error. Indeed, an unspoken asumption
of the Court in this case seemed to be that the occupation tribunals in the
South were state (and not federal) courts, a conclusion that was entirely
unsupportable.' Perhaps the Court desired not to disturb the contrary
rulings in Tennessee;' 1 ' however, the Court did not mention the earlier
204. Id. at 159-61.
205. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
206. 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 276 (1874). See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
207.

89 U.S. (22 Wall.) at 296-97.

208. Id. at 297.
209. See 25 La. Ann. 387, 388-89 (1873).
210. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Scott v. Billgerry, 40 Miss. 119, 135 (1866) (Ellett, J.) (the cotton equity
court "was not a State, but a Federal court, deriving its existence, and all its powers, from
the Federal Government."). Although some of the Civil War occupation courts combined
state and federal jurisdiction, none pretended-save for the reconstituted parish courts in
New Orleans, supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text-that the basis for their authority
was state law. See also Jecker v. Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498, 515 (1951) (Taney,
C.J.) (referring to the prize court at Monterey, noting that "[e]very court of the United
States ... must derive its jurisdiction and judicial authority from the Constitution or the
laws of the United States.").
It should also be pointed out that Judge Ellett, sometime justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court, also sat as a special judge in Tennessee, ruling in Hefferman v. Porter, 46
Tenn. (6 Cold.) 391 (1869), the case that first affirmed the establishment of the Memphis
civil commission courts, but which was later overruled.
212. See supra notes 199-204 and accompanying text. Cf. Scott v. Billgerry, 40 Miss. 119,
132-35 (1866) (in which the Mississippi Supreme Court ruled that the Mississippi Cotton
Equity Court, see supra note 79 and accompanying text, was properly established by order
of the provisional governor in the absence of any indication that the President disapproved
of the measure).
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decision of Walt v. Thomasson in the briefs or in the opinion. Nonetheless, Justice Field, in dissenting from the decision in Mechanics' Bank,
plainly had been influenced by the Tennessee Supreme Court's approach
when he argued vigorously for a strict showing of presidential authorization for the establishment of occupation courts having civil jurisdiction.""8
He insisted "that where [occupation] courts [are] established the authority from the President must be shown, and that it cannot be presumed
from the mere existence of the courts, and the exercise of jurisdiction by
4
1

them."M

While today, with the advent of modern communications and the centralization of executive authority, the question of presidential delegation
is no longer significant,1 5 these earlier cases do intimate that the jurisdiction of an Article II court is limited in one particular way. The Supreme
Court declared in 1851, upon review of the proceedings of the special
prize court established at Monterey during the Mexican War,'21 that
"neither the President nor any military officer can establish a court in a
conquered country, and authorize it to decide upon the rights of the
United States, or of individuals in prize cases, nor to administer the laws
of nations.'

21 7

This holding was consistent with earlier precedent, 18 and

later courts appeared to confirm this one jurisdictional bar for presiden1
tial tribunals.'
Questions surrounding the jurisdiction of Article" II courts were so bitterly debated because direct review of their judgments was a near impossibility. The Supreme Court was consistent in holding that Article III
courts were powerless to hear appeals of occupation tribunal decisions,
just as they were barred from considering appeals from military commissions or courts-martial except by legislative leave."20 Even when the directive establishing the executive court allowed for appeals, as was the case
in General Order Number 88 creating the Puerto Rico Provisional
213.

89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 276, 301-07 (1874) (Field, J., dissenting).

214. Id. at 306-07 (Field, J., dissenting).
215.

See, e.g., Madsen v. Kinsella, 93 F. Supp. 319, 324 (S.D. W.Va. 1950) (Moore, J.)

("It makes no difference through what agency he may act; the President is still commanderin-chief .... ").
216. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
217.
218.

Jecker v. Montgomery, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 498, 515 (1851) (Taney, C.J.).
See, e.g., Snell v. Faussatt, 22 F. Cas. 714, 716 (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (No. 13,138).

219. See Surrency, supra note 87, at 87; ProvisionalCourt, supra note 90, at 73 (indicating that contemporary opinion was that the Louisiana Provisional Court was barred from

prize proceedings, thus necessitating revival of U.S. district court in New Orleans). See also
Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1901).
220. See, e.g., Ex parte Vallandingham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863). See also Scott v.

Billgerry, 40 Miss. 119, 136 (1866) (a later ordinance of the provisional Mississippi legislature allowed for an appeal of decisions from the Cotton Equity Court to the Mississippi
Supreme Court). See also Neely, supra note 49, at 65-68 (for more on Vallandingham).
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Court,2 2 1 the Supreme Court held that the Court itself was not empow-

ered to review its proceedings by certiorari.222 More recent occupation
courts have allowed a second level of review. The United States High
Commission Courts and the Ryukyu Civil Administration courts provided
an appellate panel,223 while the United States Court for Berlin permitted
appeals to the United States Ambassador in Bonn.'2 Collateral attacks
on judgments and convictions were used to question the legitimacy of
presidential tribunals, but few courts, as noted above, sought to overturn
the jurisdiction of these institutions.
Courts likewise deferred on the issue of how long occupation courts
could remain in operation after the termination of actual hostilities.
Judges seemed to agree that the conclusion of a peace treaty did not end
the president's authority to maintain an executive tribunal.'s2 The Provisional Court for Louisiana, for example, carried on with its work long after the state had been militarily subdued and the vestiges of civil authority had reasserted themselves.2 e Charles Peabody, judge of that court,
concluded that until state sovereignty was restored, the Provisional Court
would continue to operate,22 7 as stipulated in President Lincoln's order
creating it. 8 2s In Burke v. Miltenberger,22 9 the Supreme Court, Justice
Davis writing, held that the restoration of civil authority in Louisiana occurred in April 1866 (as with all the Southern states, save Texas), 2 0 but
that the jurisdiction of the Provisional Court only lapsed with the act of
Congress that terminated its existence and transferred its cases to the
federal district and circuit courts.231
Military occupations can subsist for a time after hostilities have ended
with the ratification of a treaty of peace, a fact that the Supreme Court
221. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text. See also WHITING, supra note 90, at
287-88.
222. See In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126, 127 (1900).
223. See Allied High Commission, Law No. 1, art. 2, 15 Fed. Reg. 2086 (1950) and Exec.
Order No. 10713, § 10(d), 22 Fed. Reg. 4007 (1957). The Court of Appeals of the U.S. Military Government Courts in Germany handed down 1,083 opinions, reported in bound
volumes, printed from 1949-55.
224. See supra note 130.
225. See Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 1 N.M. (Gild.) 34, 43-44 (1853).
226. See United States v. Reiter, 27 F. Cas. 768, 777-78 (Prov. Ct. La. 1865) (No. 16,146).
227. Id. at 778 ("At the time this motion was made... there was not a court in the part
of Louisiana within the federal lines having any reasonable pretence of authority from any
other source than the federal government.").
228. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
229. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 519 (1873).
230. Id. at 525. See also Daniel v. Hutcheson, 22 S.W. 933, 937-38 (Tex. 1893).
231. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) at 525; see also Act of July 28, 1866, ch. 310, 14 Stat. 344.
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recognized later in Madsen v. Kinsella.23s This period can be as short as
ten months, as was the case with the Puerto Rico Provisional Court, 83 or
as long as ten, twenty-five, or even forty-five years, as happened with the
occupations of Germany proper, the Ryukyu islands, and West Berlin.""
The longevity of the Ryukyu and Berlin occupations was rationalized and
accepted as a protective measure pending the return of the territories to
their original owners2 8 5 The Court has never held an executive tribunal
constitutionally infirm because the Court deemed that the President's authority to govern occupied territory had lapsed. Nonetheless, the length
of an occupation has affected jurists' consideration of the law applied by
those tribunals, and particularly the question whether any constitutional
guarantees extend to parties before such courts. This subject will be examined in the next section.
IV. THE LAw APPLIED BY PRESIDENTIAL TRIBUNALS

A.

The Constitution

Whether Article II courts are obliged to observe the Constitution is
part and parcel of a larger question whether the Constitution applies at
all beyond the frontiers of the United States. Since the United States has
established executive tribunals abroad, or at least beyond the territory in
which it exercised effective control, it is important to understand the historical contours of this larger doctrinal debate. The Supreme Court's first
pronouncement on the subject was in In re Ross,"'6 in which the Court
considered a challenge to a seaman's murder conviction by a consular
court in Japan.23 7 The Court virtually declared that the loss of constitutional rights was a small price to pay for an American not to be delivered
up to heathen authorities for prosecution. 8 8
232. 343 U.S. 341, 348 n.12 (1952). See also Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 124 (1901)
(noting that duration of an occupation is to be determined solely by executive branch).
233. See Act of Apr. 12, 1900, ch. 191, § 34, 31 Stat. 77, 84; Santiago v. Nogueras, 2 P.R.
Fed. R. 467, 478-83 (D.P.R. 1907).
234. See supra notes 113-43 and accompanying text.

235. For the course of the occupation of Okinawa and the Ryukyus, see United States ex
rel. Jacobs v. Froehlke, 334 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (D.D.C. 1971); Williamson v. Alldridge, 320
F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Okl. 1970). For more on the Berlin court, see United States v. Tiede, 86

F.R.D. 227, 232-35 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979); Fullerton, suipra note 35, at 29-47.
236. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
237. Id. at 453. For more on the consular court system, see supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
238. 140 U.S. at 465.

While, therefore, in one aspect the American accused of crime committed in [Oriental] countries is deprived of the guarantees of the Constitution against unjust
accusation and a partial trial, yet in another aspect he is a gainer, in being with-
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At the turn of the century, the Supreme Court decided a series of controversies that elaborated on the holding in Ross. Known collectively as
the Insular Cases,'" the Court was primarily concerned with the issue of

levying import duties on goods entering this country from the recentlyconquered colonies of Spain, including Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. " The Court did pass, however, on the issue of rights afforded to
criminal defendants. In Hawaii v. Mankichi,s'" it held that a conviction
without the benefit of an indictment or a unanimous jury verdict was acceptable in a territory of the United States because those rights were not
considered "fundamental." 4 When read with Ross, the rule developed
drawn from the procedure of their tribunals, often arbitrary and oppressive, and
sometimes accompanied with extreme cruelty and torture.
Id.
239. Those opinions that constitute the Insular Cases are: Fourteen Diamond Rings v.
United States, 183 U.S. 176 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901); Huus v.
New York & P.R. S.S. Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901);
Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222
(1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901);
Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901). See also Littlefield, The Insular Cases, 15 HARv. L
REv. 169 (1901) (finding the views expressed in these cases to be inconsistent).
240. See, e.g., Downes, 182 U.S. at 287 (holding that Puerto Rico was "not a part of the
United States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution"). But see De Lima, 182 U.S.
at 283, 285-86 (for opposite holding).
241. 190 U.S. 197 (1903). The issue in this case was whether, during the period between
Hawaii's annexation by treaty and formal incorporation into the United States, the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments were deemed to supplant the islands' existing legislation on civil
and criminal procedure. Id. at 209-11, 214-15. For more on this issue, See also Ex Parte
Edwards, 13 Haw. 32 (1900) and W.C. Peacock & Co. v. Republic of Haw., 12 Haw. 27

(1899).
It is important to note, however, that the United States did not erect any new courts in
Hawaii after annexation, and instead left the existing judicial system intact until the territory was organized by Congress. Thus no Article II courts were established in Hawaii at that
time.
It might be suggested, however, that the provost courts established in Hawaii after the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor were Article II courts. These tribunals are not considered
in this survey because the ostensible jurisprudential basis for their creation was Congress'
grant to the territorial governor, in the Hawaii Organic Act, 31 Stat. 141, 153 (1900), of the
power to declare martial law. See id. § 67. In any event, this ground for their creation was
rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). For
more on these war-time courts in Hawaii, see Scheiber & Scheiber, Constitutional Liberty
in World War II: Army Rule and Martial Law in Hawaii, 1941-1946, 3 W. LEGAL HiST.341
(1990).
242. 190 U.S. at 217-18. Cf. id. at 236-41 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that any territory over which the United States is sovereign is entitled to be protected by the full ambit
of the Constitution). It should be noted that although a grand jury indictment remains, as
yet, a non-fundamental right in constitutional jurisprudence, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 538 (1884), the right to a jury trial is now considered fundamental. Duncan v.Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
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that Americans in unincorporated territories were entitled only to fundamental rights; those residing elsewhere outside of the United States re4
ceived no protections at all.2 8

Only after the Second World War did the Court shift away from the
restrictive Ross and Insular Cases holdings and towards a permissive application of the Constitution abroad. The issue arose again in the 1957
landmark decision of Reid v. Covert,2 4 4 a case that presented similar facts
as in Madsen v. Kinsella.'" In Covert the Court addressed the preliminary question of whether the Constitution applied abroad. In holding that
it did, the Court distinguished both the Ross and Insular Cases holdings.
The Court summarily rejected Ross as misconceived, 24 6 and further held
that the Insular Cases had themselves repudiated Ross."7 As to the notion in the Insular Cases that only "fundamental" rights could be applied
in unincorporated territories, the Court eschewed the idea that rights
could be distinguished by their fundamental or nonfundamental
character. 46
In the decision in Covert the Court found another ground for distinguishing the Insular Cases insofar as "they involved the power of Congress to provide rules and regulations to govern temporarily territories
with wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions whereas here the basis
for governmental power is American citizenship."'24' This passage raised a
number of distinct doctrinal possibilities for the extraterritorial application of the Constitution. First, there might be a new test for the application of constitutional rights. Instead of the Constitution being linked with
243. See also Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 304-09 (1922); Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138, 146-49 (1904) (holding that right to jury trial in criminal actions was not
required in Puerto Rico or the Philippines, respectively).
244. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
245. 343 U.S. 341 (1952). See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text. In Madsen the
Supreme Court was faced with the habeas petition of a woman convicted of murdering her

husband, an air force officer stationed in occupied Germany in 1949, by the Courts of the
Allied High Commission. 343 U.S. at 360. See supra notes 113-19 and text. She claimed,
curiously, that she was entitled to a general court-martial, which would have been without
benefit of a jury. Arguably, Madsen has no bearing on the issue of jury trials in occupation
courts, since the defendant never asked for one. 343 U.S. at 360 n.26.
246.

This was accomplished by simply declaring that the case:

rested, at least in substantial part, on a fundamental misconception and 'the most
that can be said in support of the result reached there is that the consular court
jurisdiction had a long history antedating the adoption of the Constitution. The
Congress has recently buried the consular system of trying Americans. We are not
willing to jeopardize the lives and liberties of Americans by disinterring it. At
best, the Ross case should be left as a relic from a different era.
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12 (1957) (footnote omitted).

247. Id. at 12 n.19.
248. Id. at 9.
249. Id. at 14.

1993]

ARTICLE II COURTS

865

sovereignty and territory, it would be an inherent aspect of citizenship.25 0
This possibility reflected a realized vision of the United States as a superpower, no longer pressed by other nations into limitations on the Constitution's scope and authority.
Second, application of the Constitution abroad might depend on sovereignty, specifically on territorial control. This reading required a distinction between "uncivilized" territories in the process of being incorporated
into the United States, when the Constitution would not apply, and territories where the United States already exercised authority, when the
Constitution could apply.5's It was not clear, therefore, whether the extraterritorial application of the Constitution was an attribute of citizenship
or of territory.
The history of occupation courts suggests that it might, instead, have
been a matter of power and expediency. Yet, while one might expect that
few Article II courts recognized constitutional guarantees in their proceedings, just the opposite is true. And although scholars and authorities
have suggested that the President has complete discretion to prescribe
the law applied by executive tribunals,'5 and thus may order that constitutional protections have no force in their proceedings,'' this discretion
has apparently not been exercised in that fashion.
250.

The Supreme Court described this as almost a first principle of constitutional

interpretation:
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. 'It can only act in accordance with all the limitations
imposed by the Constitution. When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just
because he happens to be in another land.
Id. at 5-6 (Justice Black continued by quoting the Bible, Acts 22:24-29 (Paul's claim on
Roman citizenship at trial in Judea), and citing older British authority). For contrary view,
see id. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
251. See id. at 64 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (saying that Ross could not apply automatically "to the present situation, involving hundreds of thousands of American citizens in
countries with civilized systems of justice"). Strangely, Justice Frankfurter endorsed the
"fundamental" rights distinction of the Insular Cases. Id. at 53. However, he also declared
that they were inapplicable where the court was not sitting in a U.S. "territory." Id.

252. See Williamson v. Alldridge, 320 F. Supp. 840, 843 (W.D. Okl. 1970) (Daugherty, J.)
("The rights to grand jury indictment and jury trial in the Civil Administration courts are
not constitutional rights but only rights existing at the pleasure of the President."); RossrrTR, supra note 65, at 122-23.
253. See WHMNG, supra note 90, at 289.
[H]owever organized or established, [Article II] courts exercise no part of the judicial power of the government under the Constitution. Hence it is obvious that [the
Bill of Rights] ha[s] no application to military courts, or to the proceedings
thereof; but relate only to the exercise of civil and judicial power conferred by
judicial courts.
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Courts have made clear that one constitutional right is definitionally
denied to parties before executive tribunals: the right to have a judicial
official, with life tenure and protection from salary diminution under Article III of the Constitution, adjudicate one's cause. Once the Supreme
Court ruled in 1828 that courts of the United States could be established
other than pursuant to Article III1'2

this argument became untenable.

Recently, parties to a case challenging the authority of the Civil Administration courts of the Ryukyu Islands resurrected that argument;25s however, the court ruled that since the President lawfully constituted that
tribunal under his war-making powers, the defendant was not entitled to
be judged by an Article III official.2 "
One might justly sense some circularity in this holding. The above argument was an attack on the constitutionality of the executive tribunal.
As previously demonstrated, only in the most extreme circumstances of
improper delegation,'8

7

or of a technically-deficient grant of jurisdic-

tion,"' has a reviewing judge or official found an Article II court to be
improperly established.
Had Rose been decided some fifteen years later, the defendant's lawyers might have argued that under the standard enunciated by the plurality in Northern Pipeline259 and by the Court in Commodity Futures
Trading Commission v. Schor,'60 no Article II court should be allowed to
operate. However, a court likely would find this line of authority to be
inapposite, for the simple reason that Article I of the Constitution established the tribunals at issue in those cases. The real issue presented was
whether Congress had exceeded the constitutional limits of its authority
in granting jurisdictional competence to territorial and specialized courts,
as well as to courts-martial. The standard enunciated in those cases, particularly Schor's four-prong test,"" is simply irrelevant to presidential
tribunals. So, aside from a policy argument that parties deserve greater
protection from government (read "military") abuses in Article II proId. See supra notes 164-66 (for more on the debate whether Article II tribunals are courts
established under the Constitution).
254. See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). See also supra notes 323 and accompanying text for more on the doctrine distinguishing Article I from Article III
courts.

255. See Rose v. McNamara, 375 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (in which defendant, a naturalized American citizen, was convicted of evading a local tax).

256. Id. at 927-28.
257.
258.
259.

See supra notes 193-214 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
458 U.S. 50, 63-64 (1982) (Brennan, J.). See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying

text.
260.

478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1986). See supra note 23.

261. 458 U.S. at 850-51.
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ceedings, 2 no legal basis exists for an entitlement to Article III
adjudicators.
In contrast to this jurisprudential position, occupation courts have been
liberal in granting many other constitutional rights. In the only prosecution before the United States Court for Berlin, 2 " United States v.
Tiede,2 04 the Court freed one of the codefendants, charged with air piracy
incriminating statements
and kidnapping, when it ruled to suppress her
2
taken in violation of the Fifth Amendment. "5
Presidential courts periodically used grand juries, established under the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, to bring indictments or presentments in criminal prosecutions. During the Civil War, the Provisional
Court for Louisiana apparently required the return of indictments,", although no record remains concerning the composition of the grand jury or
whether it ever returned a "no bill," thus declining to prosecute. Apparently, the Puerto Rico Provisional Court did not provide for grand jury
indictments,"" but charges did proceeed on information. 2 " And while the
Allied High Commission Courts in Germany did not allow for grand juries, 269 the Civil Administration Courts of
the Ryukyu Islands, after ini2 70
tially barring that right, later granted it.
262. See, e.g., Fullerton, supra note 35, at 17-19.
263. See supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text.
264. 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979).
265. See HERBERT STERN, JUDGMENT IN BERLIN 212 (1984) (for Judge Stern's account of
the proceedings). United States v. Tiede was considered an extraordinarily sensitive case by
the State Department. Defendants, two East Germans, had hijacked a plane from Poland
and forced it to land in West Berlin. The United States was waging a war against air piracy
and was encouraging other nations to participate. See Andreas Lowenfeld, Hijacking, Freedom, and the "American Way," 83 MICH. L. REv. 1000, 1000, 1011-14 (1985) (review of H.
STERN, JUDGMENT IN BERLIN (1984)). Having an East German hijack a plane to West Berlin
was a political embarassment. So much so, that the German authorities were relieved to
have the American sector authorities remove the prosecution from the local Berlin courts, as
per Law Number 7. Supra note 122, art. 7.
Herbert Stern, United States District Judge for the District of New Jersey, was appointed
by the Amabassador in Bonn as judge of the Berlin Court. The propriety of an Article III
judge sitting in such a capacity has been disputed. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361 (1989); In re Application of the President's Comm'n on Organized Crime, 763 F.2d 1191,
1197-98 (l1th Cir. 1985) (holding the practice unconstitutional); In re President's Comm'n
on Organized Crime, 783 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding the practice constitutional).
266. See United States v. Reiter, 27 F. Cas. 768, 769 (Prov. Ct. La. 1865) (No. 16,146);
ROBINSON, supra note 80, at 109; BIRKHIMER, supra note 45, at 165; ProvisionalCourt, supra
note 90, at 73. The courts established in New Mexico in 1847 by General Kearney also,
apparently, used grand juries. See POLDERVAART, supra note 68, at 25.
267. See Ex Parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 385 (1900).
268. See Basso v. United States, 239 U.S. 602, 605 (1916).
269. See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 360 (1952).
270. See Rose v. McNamara, 252 F. Supp. 111, 112 (D.D.C. 1966); Ryukyu Islands Civil
Administration Ordinance, No. 144 (Mar. 16, 1955), Change No. 19 (Mar. 8, 1963), ch. 5, §
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It goes without saying, however, that the most prized privilege under
the Bill of Rights is trial by jury in both civil and criminal cases.2 71 The
defense of this right was the most hotly contested issue in this area of
Article II courts' constitutional jurisprudence. Because the Louisiana Provisional Court granted not only grand jury indictments, but also petit
jury trials, this issue did not arise in that forum. 2 Instead, the question
of the right to a jury before an occupation tribunal was first presented
before the Mississippi Supreme Court, sitting in review of a decision of
the Special Court of Equity for Cotton 78 in the case of Scott v.
Billgerry.74 As discussed above,'7 5 the Cotton Court was given equity jurisdiction over contracts involving cotton and other personal property,
and given the power to order either rescission of the contract or specific
performance. The purpose of the Court was to settle many long-standing
disputes that arose from cotton supply
contracts that soured because of
7
confiscations or for other reasons.2
In this case, defendant, Scott, had agreed to deliver seventy-five bales
of cotton to plaintiff, Billgerry, in exchange for an amount paid in advance. Scott tendered the cotton, but the seventy-five bales were the subject of an order of destruction by Union forces. Although Billgerry had
contractually accepted the risk of destruction, he brought suit for specific
performance and the matter was presented before the Special Cotton Equity Court, Judge Swann presiding.277 That court ruled that defendant
was liable, at Billgerry's option, to tender thirty-six bales of cotton or the
sum of $4,464.278 Scott appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court.27e
The Mississippi Supreme Court reversed and based its judgment on the
jurisdictional competence of the Cotton Court. s0 Appellant's argument
was quite straightforward, and the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted it
1.5.1 ("Any person charged with an offense before a Civil Administration Court shall have
the right to indictment by a grand jury as to any offense which may be punished by death or
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ...
.
271. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the

right to ...

an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been

committed"); Id. amend. VII. ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy

shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved").
272. See Provisional Court, supra note 90, at 73.
273.
274.
275.

See supra notes 79, 211-12.
40 Miss. 119 (1866).
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.

276.
277.

See 40 Miss. at 138-39.
Id. at 120-23.

278. Id. at 131. The dispositive factual issue was whether Mrs. Scott had, in some fashion, colluded with the Union troops ordered to burn Billgerry's cotton. It appears that her

cotton was not burned. Id. at 123-31.
279.

See supra note 220.

280.

40 Miss. at 143-47.
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in its entirety. The Cotton Court, it ruled, was a creation of the Constitution, under the President's Article II powers.28 1 The Cotton Court was, by
the very terms of the military Governor's order creating it, a tribunal with
only equity jurisdiction. 82 Therefore, it did not provide for trial by jury,
and none was granted in this case. Nonetheless, in issuing a money judgment as an alternative form of remedy, the Cotton Court had invaded the
province of a court of law, and adjudged a matter that would normally be
reserved for the jury. Therefore, the Cotton Court, by entertaining a petition seeking money damages, had exceeded its jurisdiction and its award
was null and void. 88
The Mississippi Supreme Court, Justice Ellett writing, held that:
[without disputing the power of the Executive of the nation, while holding a State under absolute military rule, to create provisional govern-

ments, to ordain laws, and to establish judicial tribunals for their administration, still, all these powers must be exercised in subordination to the
Constitution of the United States. That instrument recognizes the distinction between legal and equitable rights, and when the President, or
his subordinates, undertake to create civil tribunals to administer the
laws of any State or Territory, held for the time being under military
dominion, he is bound to respect these fundamental regulations, and to
refrain from exercising power which the legislative department of the
government would not, in the same case, possess. He may abstain from
instituting civil tribunals, if he will; but if he exercises the power, he
cannot disregard the restrictions of the organic law.'"
In short, the President may not subvert a citizen's right to a jury trial in a
civil matter by creating a tribunal and granting it only equity jurisdiction.
This holding was rejoined in a vigorous dissent by Chief Justice Handy,
who argued for a wide interpretation of presidential powers, used in this
instance to create a tribunal charged with resolving all extant property
disputes.2 More importantly, the dissent argued that constitutional
guarantees could not be applied in occupation courts. "[T]his special
court of equity," Chief Justice Handy wrote, "was an emanation of military power, in the abnormal political condition in which the State was
then placed; and it would appear, that the rules for the ordinary action of
the Federal Government were not applicable to such a state of things."'"
It was important to note, however, that the Mississippi Supreme Court
did not hold the Special Cotton Court to be unconstitutionally organized;
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 132-36.
Id. at 136-39.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

143-47.
143.
147-55 (Handy, C.J., dissenting).
155 (Handy, C.J., dissenting).
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rather, it ruled that the Cotton Court had exceeded its narrow jurisdiction and that its competence could287not be extended without violating the
Constitution of the United. States.
The decision in Scott explicitly required that Article II courts observe
the Constitution in their proceedings. Later decisions were less categorical in their approach. General Order Number 88, which established the
Puerto Rico Provisional Court, allowed that a "jury system may be introduced or dispensed with in any particular case in the discretion of the
court. ' '2 Apparently, jury trials were never granted by this court,' 9 nor
were they available before the Military Government Courts, the precursor
to the Allied High Commission Courts in occupied Germany. The Supreme Court noticed this in Madsen v. Kinsella, although the fact that
the Military Government Courts were assimilated to courts-martial explained the absence of jury trials in their proceedings.1s Therefore, the
Supreme Court has never been required to squarely confront the issue of
jury trials before executive tribunals.
The issue arose with a vengeance in criminal prosecutions before the
Ryukyu Islands Civil Administration courts. Under the Code of Penal
Law and Procedure, originally promulgated for these courts in 1955, defendants were not afforded the rights to an indictment, a jury trial, or
benefit of counsel.' 1 In two cases decided by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia in 1962 and 1963, defendants challenged their convictions by a Civil Administration Court sitting without a
jury.2 " In these habeas corpus actions, the government contended that
the institution of a jury system was entirely impracticable and would undermine the American administration on the islands. 2 s This argument
287. See also Fulton v. Woodman, 40 Miss. 593, 597-98 (1866) (holding, in another case,
that the Cotton Equity Court had acted within its jurisdiction).
288. General Order No. 88 (June 27, 1899), § 5 (reprinted in Santiago v. Nogueras, 2
P.R. Fed. R. 467, 490 (D.P.R 1907)).
289. See, e.g., Ex parte Baez, 177 U.S. 378, 385 (1900).
290. Id. at 359-60 n.26. See also United States Military Gov't v. Ybarbo, in 1 UNrID
STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT COURTS FOR THE UNITED STATES AREA OF CONTROL IN GER-

COURT OF APPEALS REPORTS OPINIONS NoS. 1-20 207, 212 (1949) ("(1n order to have
the U.S. Constitution . . . extend to any territory not included within the continental
MANY:

United States, Congress must pass a law expressly incorporating such territory into the
United States.").
291. See United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Code of Penal Law
and Procedure, ch. 5 (Mar. 16, 1955); see also Rose v. McNamara, 252 F. Supp. 111, 113

(D.D.C. 1966).
292. See Ikeda v. McNamara, Habeas Corpus No. 416-62 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1962), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 856 (1967); Nicholson v. McNamara, Habeas Corpus No. 141-61 (Memorandum) (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 1963).
293.

See Affidavit of Powell Pierpoint,

141-61 (D.D.C. filed June 21, 1963).

4, Nicholson v. McNamara, Habeas Corpus No.
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relied on the earlier Ross and Insular Cases decisions of the Supreme
Court,'

and Was employed whenever opposition developed to the use of

juries in American territories."'9 On both occasions, the D.C. Court ruled
that petitioner's constitutional rights had been violated. 2" Immediately
thereafter a jury system was instituted for the Civil Administration
97
Courts.2

Unfortunately, the D.C. District Court did not provide any reasons in
its unpublished holdings, and the matters were never reviewed on appeal.
One can assume that Judges McLaughlin and McGarraghy were troubled
that the occupation of the Ryukyu Islands, which when initiated in 1952
was intended to be temporary, had subsisted for ten years and that no
end was in sight.28 .Indeed, the Civil Administration Court system lasted
until 1971.' The length of the occupation apparently lessened the President's discretion to deny jury trials before executive tribunals.
This was the explicit holding in the last reported decision of an Article
II tribunal, the 1979 order of the United States Court for Berlin in
United States v. Tiede.30 Judge Stern's opinion can rightly be consid294. See supra notes 236-43 and accompanying text.
295. See also a number of cases concerning American possessions in the Pacific. In King
v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1975), plaintiff sued the Secretary of the Interior for
injunctive relief since the territorial court of Samoa had convicted him of tax evasion without a jury. Id. at 1142-43. Plaintiff correctly noted that since a jury trial was now considered
a "fundamental" right, under the Insular Cases, the court of a territory was required to give
him one. The Circuit Court, in dicta, made a weak attempt to question whether the jury
system was suitable for Samoa. Id. at 1147 (citing Justice Harlan's concurrence in Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) ("[T]he particular local setting, the practical necessities, and
the possible alternatives are relevant to a question of judgment, namely, whether jury trial
should be deemed a necessary condition of the exercise of Congress' power to provide for
the trial of Americans overseas.")). The Circuit Court remanded this question for consideration, and it was later decided that the jury system was, indeed, appropriate for Samoa. See
King v. Andrus, 452 F. Supp. 11, 17 (D.D.C. 1977). See also Ralpho v. Bell, 569 F.2d 607
(D.C. Cir. 1977), in which the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment was applied to a
property valuation proceeding in Micronesia. Id. at 618-19. But see Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands v. Atalig, 723 F.2d 682 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1244
(1984) (in which Circuit Court held that fundamental right of jury trial may not extend to
all felonies in the local courts of the Northern Mariana Islands). Id. at 689-90.
296. See supra note 292.
297. See Ryukyu Islands Civil Administration Ordinance, No. 144 (Mar. 16, 1955),
Change No. 19 (Mar. 8, 1963), ch. 5, § 1.5.3. Qualifications for serving as a juror were also
specified, but among these, being an American citizen was not one of them. Id. § 1.5.5 (instead requiring only three months residence on the islands). See Rose v. McNamara, 375
F.2d 924, 926-27 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding that defendant was not entitled to a jury
composed solely of American citizens). See also George, supra note 136, at 803-05.
298. See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text. See also United States ex rel. Jacobs v. Froehlke, 334 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (D.D.C. 1971).
299. See supra note 143.
300. 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979). See also supra note 264.
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ered the culmination of the constitutional jurisprudence of presidential
courts, and provides the major reason why another Article II court will
probably never again be established. The State Department, whose attorneys conducted the prosecution of the East German hijacker, sorely underestimated Judge Stern's independence. He angrily rejected both their
argument that he had no discretion to interpret the Constitution to allow
for a jury trial in the case, and the corollary notion that the political
question doctrine precluded an exercise of his authority. 0 ' Judge Stern
noted that:
[tihe Prosecution's position, if accepted by the Court, would have dramatic consequences not only for the two defendants whom the United
States had chosen to arraign before the Court, but for every person
within the territorial limits of the United States Sector of Berlin. If the
occupation authorities are not governed by the Constitution in this
Court, they are not governed by the Constitution at all. And, if the occupation authorities may act free of all constitutional restraints, no one in
the American Sector of Berlin has any *protection from their untrammeled discretion. 82
On this point, the court concluded that "there has never been a time
when United States authorities exercised governmental powers in any geographical area-whether at war or in times of peace-without regard for
their own Constitution."M0
Judge Stern was careful to limit his holding granting a trial by jury to
"friendly aliens, charged with civil offenses."" He did not extend it to
govern a military commission trying a case in wartime, during a belligerent occupation before the termination of war, or when the offense involved espionage, sabotage, or an infraction of the laws of war.30 After
first charting the history of judicial review of occupation court procedures'" and then emphasizing the length of the Berlin occupation with
its unique role in the Cold War,30 7 the court held that a jury trial could be
granted under the Constitution.3 0 8 The State Department was displeased
301. 86 F.R.D. at 238-44.
302. Id.at 242-43.
303. Id. at 242.
304. Id. at 244.
305. Id. at 244-45. For more on military commissions, see supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
306. 86 F.R.D. at 253-59. Judge Stern took special care to distinguish the Madsen footnote, mentioned supra at note 290 and accompanying text, by noting that the Supreme
Court was concerned with jury trials before courts-martial, and not occupation tribunals. 86
F.R.D. at 255.
307. 86 F.R.D. at 245-47.
308. Id. at 260.
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with Judge Stern's decision. After the defendant was convicted on a lesser
charge and later released for time served, Stern was dismissed as judge of
the United States Court for Berlin.""'
Although Judge Stem's holding has been criticized on a number of
grounds, 10 it remains a landmark contribution to the law of executive
courts. He was careful to limit his holding to the procedures used in Article II courts, as defined in this study, and did not stray into the jurisprudential minefield of military commissions and their authority. There can
be no doubt that presidential tribunals must at least afford the most basic constitutional protections to parties-and among these must be included the right to a jury trial. The decision in Tiede caps a series of
decisions, beginning with Reid v. Covert s " and continuing through the
Ryukyu Island holdings, which virtually repudiate any notion that the
Constitution can be withheld from those involved in proceedings before
American courts, even those held abroad.
As suggested above, however, the longevity of a particular Article II
tribunal is often a key factor in determining whether any of these constitutional guarantees will be granted. When the occupation is fresh and
Congress intends to quickly exercise its power to politically organize a
territory, there has been a tendency to allow procedural restrictions on
these freedoms. But once hostilities have ended and the belligerent occupation is reduced to a civilian administration, the government's rationale
for denying these privileges is gradually eroded until it fails altogether.
B. Respect for Local Laws
The foregoing has been concerned with the role of the Constitution in
the practice of Article II courts, specifically procedural rights to an indictment, legal representation, and to a jury trial. The question that remains
is what substantive law has been applied by these tribunals. A few observations will suffice on this point.
During the Civil War, occupation courts not only applied state law, but
also commonly acted as state courts. Though these tribunals exercised
jurisdiction normally reserved for state courts, it was always with the un309. STERN, supra note 265, at 374. Just before he was dismissed, a group of Berlin residents sought to file a civil case before the Court, see Dostal v. Haig, Civ. A. No. 79-1964
(D.D.C. 1979) (excerpted in MARION NASH, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 1979 787 (1983)), aff'd, 652 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1981), even though its jurisdiction was limited to criminal matters. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
310. See, e.g., Dostal v. Haig, 652 F.2d 173, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (noting that Stern "ordered that 500 unsuspecting Berliners be rounded up to make a venire for the trial"); Fullerton, supra note 35, at 11 n.29 (suggesting that empaneling venire of non-U.S. citizens
violated 28 U.S.C. § 1869(f) (1988)).
311. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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derstanding that the source of their authority was the force of arms of the
federal authorities. 13 As the Louisiana Supreme Court noted in Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Union Bank,31' 3 "as a sovereign the United States
is bound by the limitations of the constitution, and, of course, it cannot
appoint a judge to a State court, much less create a State court and appoint the judge to administer it. 1'1 So, for example, the parish courts
established in New Orleans,15 6 as well as the alternative Louisiana Supreme Court," ' were not properly state courts at all, but were federal
tribunals that had arrogated state jurisdiction.
Most American occupation tribunals were careful to observe the local
laws in force when the territory came under the control of the American
armed forces. These tribunals changed local law only as needed to effectuate the occupation, and then only by ordinance passed by the provisional government. Article II courts did not rule by decree, nor by creating an applicable law as they progressed. Today, this is a custom of the
laws of war, but it had not always been the case. 1 It is, arguably, one of
the more important contributions that American practice has made in
this field of international humanitarian law.
This approach first manifested itself in the occupation of New Mexico
in 1846. Drawing from the precedent of the earlier cession of Florida by
the United States,318 the highest territorial court of New Mexico, and
later the United States Supreme Court, affirmed the notion that the original laws of an area remain in force until superseded by the conqueror's
legislative act. 19 This first occupation was also significant because the
United States, through its military commander on the scene, General
Kearney, quickly enacted a substantive code of law that only partially
modified the earlier civil law of Mexico.3s 0
Similarly, the Union occupation courts in the South respected the state
law in force in those districts. For example, the Provisional Court for
Louisiana consistently applied that state's law, which had been suggested
312. See, e.g., Scott v. Billgerry, 40 Miss. 119, 135-36 (Ellett, J.), 156-57 (Handy, C.J.,
dissenting) (1866); Lanfear v. Mestier, 18 La. Ann. 497, 506 (1866).
313. 25 La. Ann. 387 (1873).
314. Id. at 388.
315. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
318. See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 540-41 (1828). See also supra
notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
319. Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 1 N.M. (Gild.) 34, 44-45 (1853); 61 U.S. (20 How.) 176

(1857).
320. 1 N.M. (Gild.) at 55.
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by President Lincoln in his order establishing that tribunal. 21 The court
was still left with substantial discretion to refuse to apply local law in
certain cases, and Judge Peabody occasionally exercised that power., He
2
also made clear, in handing down his ruling in United States v. Reiter,33
that:
[t]his court is commissioned to administer justice, and no code of laws is
prescribed for it. It may adopt such rules as may seem wise and expedient, whether corresponding to the system in use here at the time of the
conquest, or differing from it. It has always administered justice according to the Code of Louisiana, and so have all other courts here, not because it was bound by that Code, as law of the state, but because it
seemed expedient and wise to continue along under the system found in
use here, rather than to introduce a new one." '
It seems that Judge Peabody was acting, as did many other judges of the
presidential courts of the period, only on pragmatic considerations, and
he did not feel compelled to apply local law by virtue of the Constitution
or the dictates of the laws of war.
In his order establishing a Provisional Court in Puerto Rico, General
Davis crafted a specific clause to govern suits between island natives and
suits involving contracts concluded before the occupation. s25 In such instances the "court shall, as far as practicable, conform to the precedents
and decisions of the United States courts in similar cases which have
been tried and determined in territory formerly acquired by the United
States from Spain or Mexico."82 This appears to be a veiled reference to
the practice, noted above, of applying the civil law in force in the territory unless altered by decree. This approach was problematic, particularly when a lacunae opened between the earlier Spanish law and the
2 In
decrees of the occupier, as occurred in United States v. Caparros3
Caparros defendant was charged with illegally cutting timber; however,
his act had occurred before the establishment of the provisional military
government and the creation of the Provisional Court.8 2 8 The court held
321. Reprinted in Burke v. Miltenberger, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 519, 519-20 (1873) (requiring that Judge Peabody conform "his proceedings, so far as possible, to the course of proceedings and practice which has been customary in the courts of the United States and
Louisiana").
322. See Provisional Court, supra note 90, at 72; Anonymous, supra note 73, at 268-69;
BIRKHIMER, supra note 45, at 134; ROBINSON, supra note 80, at 109.
323. 27 F. Cas. 768 (Prov. Ct. La. 1865) (No. 16,146).
324. Id. at 778.
325. General Order No. 88 (June 27, 1899), § 10 (reprinted in Santiago v. Nogueras, 2
P.R. Fed. R. 467, 491 (D.P.R. 1907)).
326. Id.
327. 1 P.R..Fed. R. 59 (D.P.R. 1900).
328. Id. at 60-61.
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that because his act was not illegal under the earlier Spanish law, he
could not be prosecuted under the new occupier's regime . 29
Likewise, in 1913, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in
Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales3 0 that a retroactive change in the law of
adverse possession, which had been effected by the United States military
commander in Puerto Rico soon after the occupation, was unlawful. The
Court decided that General Henry's order altering the existing civil law of
land tenure in Puerto Rico was an attempt to exercise legislative power,
and since General Henry made the order without express presidential authority, it would be invalidated as a deprivation of property without due
process of law.38 1 In short, because General Henry's order lacked any military purpose, and exceeded 33
his authority granted by the President, the
Court could not recognize it 2
Ochoa marks the confluence of a number of doctrinal rivers. Although
it deals with the attempted exercise of a military occupier's legislative
power, the Court acknowledged that the case actually concerned the issue
of adjudicated rights and interests of individuals. Although the Court's
basis for decision was the lack of presidential authority and inadequate
delegation, " the issue of constitutional due process under the Fifth
Amendment weighed heavily. The issue obviously would have been more
starkly presented had the President expressly approved a retroactive
change in the Puerto Rican law. Nonetheless, one may validly cite Ochoa
for the principle that courts must afford due process in judicial proceedings-however characterized-under an American occupation regime.
To conclude, the executive tribunals formed in the aftermath of the
Second World War all explicitly provided for the application of the local
law then in force.38 ' For example, criminal prosecutions before the Ryu329. Id. at 61. It has been suggested that General Butler, commander of the U.S. forces
occupying Cuba in 1899, accepted the continuing validity of Cuban laws, even though no
record has been left of an occupying court in Cuba. See United States Military Gov't v.
Ybarbo, 1 U.S. Military Gov't in Ger. Ct. App. Reports 207, 224 (1949). Likewise, the American occupiers of the Philippines in 1898 left in force (at least provisionally) most of the preexisting Spanish private law of the islands. See Gamba, supra note 144, at 72-73. See also
THOMPSON, supra note 144, at 7-98.
330. 230 U.S. 139 (1913).
331. Id. at 148-51, 160. Appellants had apparently benefitted from that military order,
and the consequent change in title.
332. Id. at 160-61.
333. See supra notes 188-214 and accompanying text.
334. For the German occupation, see Proclamation No. 2, United States Commanding
General-Europe, Sept. 19, 1945, art. 2, reprintedin 12 Fed. Reg. 6997 (1947) ("Except as
heretofore abrogated, suspended or modified by Military Government or by the Control
Council for Germany, the German law in force at the time of the occupation shall be applicable in each area of the United States Zone of Occupation, until repealed by, or superseded
by a new law ....
); see also Madsen v. Kinsella, 188 F.2d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1951); Clark
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kyu Islands Civil Administration Courts typically charged violations of
Japan's Criminal Code 8 5 as well as local regulations 33 Whether the
United States could impose its own law on Okinawa without Japanese
consent later became a contentious issue for American courts.33 Nonetheless, the Article II tribunals operating on the islands were consistent in
their observance of local law. By the end of the occupation in 1971, local
law had substantially diverged from that in force in Japan, so much so
that one might conclude that the Japanese had to engage in substantial
a8s
law reform once the area returned to its control
V.

THE LEGACY AND FUTURE OF ARTICLE

II

COURTS

What do executive tribunals tell us of our modern constitutional order?
First and foremost, they are a testament to the elasticity of a constitutional text that can stretch to accommodate circumstances of national
emergency without snapping in defense of basic freedoms.8 89 One would
expect that the President's prerogative in establishing courts of justice in
occupied lands to be completely unfettered. And although reviewing
courts have turned aside constitutional challenges to the establishment of
Article II courts on such theories as excessive jurisdiction and improper
delegation, extraordinary limitations remain in place to check the power
of these tribunals.
First, there exists a separation of powers concern incumbent in Congress' authority to politically organize territories and establish courts of
& Goodman, supra note 116, at 444-45. For the Berlin occupation, see STER., supra note
265, at 59 (confirming that defendant in Tiede was charged with violations of the German
Penal Code).
335. See Ikeda v. McNamara, Habeas Corpus No. 416-62 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1962) (charging violation of art. 246 (fraud) of Japanese Penal
Code); Nicholson v. McNamara, Habeas Corpus No. 141-61 (Memorandum) (D.D.C. Nov.
15, 1963) (Information filed May 6, 1961) (violation of arts. 199 and 205 (murder)).
336. See Ikeda v. McNamara, Habeas Corpus No. 416-62 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1962) (charging violation of article 2.3.4.1 of United States
Civil Administration Ryukyu Penal Code (operating business without a license)).
337. See, e.g., Cobb v. United States, 191 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
913 (1952). The issue in Cobb was whether Okinawa was a "foreign country" for the purposes of excluding the jurisdiction of the Federal Torts Claim Act. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k)
(1988). The Ninth Circuit decided that because the United States was barred, under the
laws of war, see supra note 154 and accompanying text, from changing the local law in force
on Okinawa, it would remain a "foreign country" and thus plaintiff's suit had to be dismissed. Cobb, 191 F.2d at 609-11. For a criticism of this holding, see David J. Bederman,
Exploring the Foreign Country Exception: Federal Tort Claims in Antarctica, 21 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L

L. 731, 744-45 (1988).

338. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
339. See generally William B. Fisch, Emergency in the Constitutional Law of the
United States, 38 AM. J. CoMP. L. 389 (Supp. 1990).
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law in those areas. As one may observe from above, neither the end of
hostilities nor the conclusion of a treaty of peace marks the end of presidential power to continue to administer justice through occupation
courts. Instead, Congress must establish courts, thereby supplanting presidential authority in this realm. Since an essential attribute of an Article
II court is that it does not require legislative concurrence for its creation,
it follows that Congress can "trump" presidential power by converting an
Article II court into an Article I tribunal. Of course, Congress can only
exercise this power when it intends to create a new territory of the United
States, signalling the incorporation of that region into the American domain and holding out at least the possibility of future statehood.
Nonetheless, no future American military occupation will likely be
made with the intent of territorial annexation. Therefore, this check on
the President's power to create and maintain Article II courts has been
vastly diminished. Congress cannot curtail the President's occupation
power with its countervailing authority to administer territories. The Supreme Court clearly recognized this fact in deciding the 1952 case, of
40 Realizing that
Madsen v. Kinsella.3
Congress' power to terminate the
jurisdiction of an Article II court by politically organizing the territory of
its operation would soon be irrelevant, the Supreme Court noted that
Congress could prospectively legislate the jurisdiction and procedures of
presidential tribunals."'
Conceivably, Congress could go so far as to prohibit the President from
creating new Article II courts or to sharply limit their jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court acknowledged that congressional reluctance to legislate in
this area has given the President a free hand, but that this deferrence
could end at any time. 2 Congress is unlikely to exercise any power to
prospectively legislate for Article II courts because it is highly unlikely
that the United States will engage in a military occupation of sufficient
length to warrant the creation of a tribunal with civil competence or
criminal jurisdiction over civilians in peacetime. Although the United
States has, since the Second World War, belligerently occupied a number
of areas, no exeoutive tribunals have been erected.
Congress also may be reluctant to intrude into this preserve of presidential power, notwithstanding Justice Jackson's encouraging comment in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,'34 that "[w]hen the President
takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his
own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
340.

343 U.S. 341 (1952).

341. Id. at 348-49.
342. Id. at 372.
343. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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over the matter. ' '8 4 In this uncharted area of separation of powers, Con-

gress may have difficulty in prospectively converting Article II courts to
an Article I footing without running afoul of the recent concerns raised by
Court in Commodity Futures Trading Commission V.
the Supreme
45
Schor3

Therefore, even if the President creates a new occupation court, Congress would probably abstain from prescribing the competence and procedures of that tribunal. In the absence of such legislation, the parties involved -in proceedings before Article II courts would have to rely on the
terms of the executive order establishing the tribunal and on the extensive jurisprudence dealing with the application of the Constitution and
local laws before such courts. As always, the most contentious issue is
likely to be the availability of basic procedural safeguards, including
grand jury indictments, jury trials, and the right to counsel. If this future
presidential court is given sufficient judicial independence, it might be
persuaded to follow the modern precedents of the Ryukyu Islands Civil
Administration Courts and the United States Court for Berlin-not to
mention the practices of the Louisiana Provisional Court and Mississippi
Cotton Equity Court-in granting these rights. Just as likely, however,
the President might seek to limit the availability of these freedoms by
explicitly barring the application of the Constitution in the constituent
document of the tribunal or in the selection of pliant jurists. Under such
circumstances, the holdings of this court may be subject to scrutiny on
constitutional grounds. As long as judicial review of the decisions of Article II courts is available either through habeas corpus proceedings in
criminal matters or through collateral attack in civil causes, these issues
will remain open.
The constitutional legacy of Article II courts is thus extraordinarily
hopeful. Far from manifesting the worst abuses of military justice, their
jurisprudence has reinforced doctrinal limits on the President's powers in
relation to the other branches of government, as well as recognizing individual rights and freedoms in what were usually circumstances in which
they were tragically ignored. An enduring constitutional order must accommodate times of war and civil unrest. Article II courts are one aspect
of that accommodation.

344. Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
345. 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1986). See also supra note 23.

